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Social Work and Diverse Models
of Public Safety: Advocating with and
on Behalf of African American Communities
David R. Hodge

Arizona State University

Stephanie Clintonia Boddie
Baylor University

George Floyd’s death sparked an intense national debate about policing
practices. In social work, the discussion has generally focused on whether
the profession should partner with, or shun, law enforcement. While
affirming the need for structural change, this paper suggests a different
approach; that social workers should advocate with and on behalf of African
American communities to implement a public safety model that reflects their
preferences. After discussing how practitioners can facilitate structural
reform in this arena, five alternative models of public safety are reviewed
to familiarize readers with options that may have some degree of currency
with African Americans: (1) reforming existing police departments; (2)
increasing community policing; (3) disbanding police departments; (4)
abolishing policing; and (5) indigenizing law enforcement.
Keywords: African Americans, police reform, alternative policing models,
public safety, social justice

George Floyd’s death on May 25, 2020 at the hands of members
of the Minneapolis Police Department ignited an intense national
debate about the role of police in society, especially in Black
neighborhoods (Foreman et al., 2020). Vigorous discussions about
policing practices have also occurred in social work (Singer,
2020). Much of this debate has focused on whether the profession
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare • June, 2021 • Volume XLVIII • Number 2
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should join with, or eschew, law enforcement. Some scholars, for
example, contend that NASW should officially call for defunding
police departments while others argue for continued or enhanced
partnering with police (Singer, 2020).
While affirming the need for structural change, this paper
proposes a different approach. The NASW Code of Ethics (2017)
states that social workers promote social justice with and on behalf
of communities (preamble, emphasis added). The Code goes on to
state that social workers enhance the capacity of people to address
their own concerns and needs. These sentiments are echoed later in
the Code, where social workers are called to promote people’s right
to self-determination and assist them in clarifying their goals.
In keeping with these ethical injunctions, this paper suggests
social workers should work with African Americans to develop a law
enforcement system that reflects their needs and concerns. Rather
than employing a single top-down solution, this paper contends
that social workers might seek to give voice to the perspectives of
African Americans in a given community and then work to see
that perspective implemented. Given the historic injustices African
Americans have experienced at the hands of law enforcement, it
is critical that African Americans’ right to self-determination in
this area be respected (Taylor, 2018). Accordingly, social workers
might use their skills to facilitate the implementation of the law
enforcement vision that reflects the views of African Americans.
Facilitating this process is likely contingent upon developing
some degree of familiarity with various conceptualizations of
law enforcement. To assist a community in clarifying their goals
regarding policing, it may be helpful if social workers have some
understanding of the various approaches for securing public safety.
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to familiarize social
workers with five public safety options that have some degree
of currency with African Americans. Before discussing these
options, however, the important role that social workers can play
as facilitators of structural reform with, and on behalf of, African
Americans is discussed.
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Social Workers as Facilitators of Structural Reform
In the United States, most police agencies are accountable to
municipal governments (Fisk & Richardson, 2017). City governments,
for example, typically oversee the law enforcement agencies in
their jurisdictions. They determine the shape and form that law
enforcement takes in their local catchment area.
Due to their proximity to local voters, city officials may be
especially responsive to their constituents’ views. This opens up
opportunities for social workers to facilitate structural change
through democratic engagement (Tice et al., 2020). Social workers
can facilitate structural reform with and on behalf of specific
African American communities.
Community practitioners, in particular, may be ideally situated
for this task (Reisch, 2016). Practitioners might work with African
American residents to assess support for various public safety
options in a particular community. During this process, it is
particularly important to ensure the most vulnerable community
members’ voices are included (i.e., those who are: older, disabled,
caring for small children or the elderly, living in poverty, etc.).
Practitioners should work to provide forums to include the views of
African Americans who have no effective platform for making their
voices heard. Once a clear consensus has emerged, practitioners
might help create networks of community-based actors to encourage
local government officials to implement public safety models that
reflect the desires of African Americans in local settings.
It is important to note that different African American
communities will have different perspectives regarding law
enforcement (Yglesias, 2020). As noted above, police departments
are a municipal entity. As a result, departments frequently have
distinct cultures that influence their interactions with residents in
their jurisdictions (U.S. Department of Justice, 2016, 2017). In turn,
these cultures interact with the diversity that exists among African
Americans to shape how local law enforcement is viewed and what
changes should be prioritized.
Consequently, it is essential to have some degree of familiarity
with the various options that African American communities
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might support. Wide dissatisfaction exists with law enforcement
as it currently exists (Crabtree, 2020). All of the following options
represent structural change—in varying degrees—from the status
quo. It should also be noted that the models often overlap in some
ways and that some observers use different labels to denote the
same options. It may also be helpful to note that law enforcement
is conceptualized broadly, encompassing both traditional and
nontraditional approaches to ensuring public safety and wellness.
With these caveats in mind, the five public safety alternatives
might be summarized under the following rubrics: (1) reforming
existing police departments; (2) increasing community policing;
(3) disbanding police departments; (4) abolishing policing; and (5)
indigenizing law enforcement.

Reforming Existing Police Departments
One popular option is reforming existing police departments.
Gallup data indicates that 81 percent of African Americans want
police to spend the same amount of time or more time in their area
(Saad, 2020). Of African Americans who experienced interaction with
police during the past year, most reported they were treated with
respect (73%) and fairly (74%) and that the overall experience was
positive (59%) (Lloyd, 2020). Concurrently, it is important to note that
these latter percentages were substantially lower than those reported
by European and Hispanic Americans (Lloyd, 2020). This may help
explain why 88 percent of African Americans believe that major
changes in existing policing practices are needed (Crabtree, 2020).
These data suggest that many African American communities
endorse existing policing models but want to effect significant
reforms. In keeping with this line of thought, the NAACP (2020)
has issued several proposals to curb police misconduct. Specifically,
they endorse tracking problematic police officers to hold them
accountable, implementing use of force guidelines, a ban on
knee and chokeholds, and the use of citizen review boards to
provide community accountability regarding instances of police
misconduct. These recommendations are similar to those advocated
by Law Enforcement Action Partnership (LEAP, 2020) to transform
policing. In addition to recommending many of the same ideas as
the NAACP, LEAP has also endorsed changing the reward system
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in which police officers work by, for example, deprioritizing arrests
in favor of diverting people to sources of assistance outside the
criminal justice system, training officers in de-escalation tactics,
and implementing collaborations with social workers (Patterson &
Swan, 2019).
In a manner consistent with the recommendations of several
social work scholars (Bailey et al., 2020; Sherraden, 2020), LEAP
(2020) advocates removing social issues from the scope of police
responsibilities. Funding would be transferred to social service
agencies to handle these issues. Social workers might implement
evidence-based interventions to address substance use, mental
health issues, and homelessness (Sherraden, 2020). It is important to
note that these recommendations have already been implemented
in various forms in diverse cities, including Los Angeles, CA
(Mazarella, 2020), Alexandria, KY (Wood, 2020), and Eugene, OR
(Andrew, 2020b). In the latter case, the CAHOOTS (Crisis Assistance
Helping Out On The Streets) program has been in operation for
approximately three decades, successfully providing emergency
responses to non-violent mental health 911 calls.
Data suggest these reforms generally have wide support
among African Americans (Crabtree, 2020). In communities where
residents want to reform existing policing models, social workers
might seek to work with community leaders to implement these
and other needed reforms (Hodge & Boddie, in press). Since many
of these ideas have extensive support among African Americans,
social workers might also seek to incorporate them in other models
when they are warranted in a given community context.

Increasing Community Policing
Another popular option in many areas may be increasing
community or neighborhood policing (Crabtree, 2020). According
to one study, approximately 58 percent of African Americans have
a favorable view of their local police and 60 percent support hiring
more officers to deal with crime (Yglesias, 2020). Interestingly, some
research also suggests that African Americans who report unfair
treatment at the hands of police are more likely to favor an increased
police presence in their communities (Yglesias, 2020).
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These perceptions are consistent with the notion that Black
neighborhoods experience disparate treatment in the area of law
enforcement staffing (Kennedy, 2012). Groups with financial or
political power typically have sufficient numbers of police officers,
or even private security personnel, to secure their personal
safety (Gstalter, 2020). The concentration of law enforcement
resources helps to ensure that members of these groups are not
victims of serious crimes, such as homicide or rape. Furthermore,
in cases where members of such groups are victimized, ample
law enforcement resources are commonly expended to quickly
apprehend perpetrators. In contrast, limited officers are deployed
in Black neighborhoods, leaving them without enough officers to
prevent or investigate serious crimes (Pew Research Center, 2020).
The absence of sufficient neighborhood law enforcement
personnel results in what has been called under-policing (Kennedy,
2012). Little attention is paid to major crimes that directly impact the
security of African Americans (U.S. Department of Justice, 2016).
Conversely, Black neighborhoods may be over-policed for relatively
minor crimes that require relatively minimal law enforcement
presence and resources (Kennedy, 2012). For instance, African
Americans may be arrested for playing cards or dice on street
corners, arrests that would not typically occur in more affluent
neighborhoods (U.S. Department of Justice, 2016).
Social workers might work with community partners to
change municipal law enforcement priorities in African American
communities that support increased neighborhood policing.
Eliminating the policing disparity by placing more officers on local
beats—officers who are dedicated to responding to the public safety
priorities of the community they are tasked with serving—can help
reduce crime (Yglesias, 2020). Governments might be encouraged
to deploy more officers in Black neighborhoods so that policing can
be refocused on protecting people from serious crime as opposed
to monitoring minor infractions that represent insignificant
community concerns (Pew Research Center, 2020). As implied
above, these changes might be implemented in conjunction with
other reforms mentioned in the previous section.
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Disbanding Police Departments
In some communities, African Americans may favor disbanding
or defunding existing police departments (McDowell & Fernandez,
2018). In some neighborhoods, law enforcement may be so ineffective
and corrupt that residents may believe that it is necessary to eliminate
the department. After dissolution, new, more community-oriented
law enforcement agencies can be created.
Camden, NJ serves as a case example of this alternative model.
Historically, violent crime rates in Camden were among the highest
in the United States (Andrew, 2020a). Corruption in the police
department was rampant which, in turn, facilitated crime and
stymied efforts to implement reforms (Andrew, 2020a). Complaints
of police misconduct were common. Due to these factors, the police
department had little, if any, community support (Belz, 2020).
Consequently, the department was dissolved in 2012 (Andrew, 2020a).
After its dissolution, a community-based policing model was
implemented that emphasized officer visibility and proactive
partnerships with community organizations (Holder, 2020). In
keeping with the reforms mentioned above, new officers were
hired and trained in de-escalation tactics, use of force guidelines,
and other measures designed to promote transparency and
accountability (Andrew, 2020a). The number of officers on the force
was increased, they were outfitted with body cameras, and then
assigned to neighborhood beats (Holder, 2020). To develop trust and
positive relationships with community members, officers would
host community barbeques, become acquainted with residents on
their beats, and seek out residents’ opinions about how they could
better serve and protect the local community (Andrew, 2020a).
A central element in this model consisted of developing
partnerships with faith-based leaders (Belz, 2020). Law enforcement
officials set up weekly meetings with clergy and other community
leaders to better understand and respond to community needs and
concerns. As part of the process of meeting residents’ needs, social
workers were integrated into law enforcement efforts (Skoufalos,
2019). Social workers collaborated with key community actors to
provide a range of services including diverting people from the
criminal justice system, connecting residents to housing, behavioral
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health services, addiction counseling, and other programs. Together,
these practices played a strategic role in legitimizing the police in
the eyes of the larger community.
The changes resulted in a dramatic drop in both complaints
about police misconduct and violent crime (Holder, 2020). It should
be noted that African Americans are disproportionally likely to
strongly support policing practices that require officers to develop
good relationships with the community (Crabtree, 2020). This model,
however, may not represent an ideal fit for all African American
communities. In the following sections two additional alternatives,
which are largely still theoretical in nature, are discussed.

Abolishing Police
A fourth option is the creation of police abolition zones. Some
22 percent of African Americans support the concept of abolishing
police departments in favor of alternative models of public safety
(Crabtree, 2020). In some communities, the systemic problems with
any traditional law enforcement model may be so deeply rooted
that African Americans want their neighborhoods to be governed
by a completely different approach.
As implied by the name, these neighborhoods would have
essentially no police presence (Vitale, 2017). As Abrams and
Dettlaff (2020) posit, funding would be redirected away from law
enforcement toward community-based public safety alternatives.
In many ways, police abolition zones are analogous to enterprise
zones. In the same way that reduced regulation in the latter is
designed to spark economic innovation, the abolition of policing
would spark innovations in community wellness and justice.
In keeping with this aim, proponents have proposed several
precepts that would guide the implementation of abolition
zones (Vitale, 2017). First, many lifestyle infractions would be
decriminalized in favor of a more libertarian approach. For
instance, penalties for selling untaxed cigarettes—which resulted
in Eric Garner’s death at the hands of police in New York City—
might be eliminated (Fryer, 2019). Second, funding would be
redirected toward social programs that address crime at the
level of root causes (Vitale, 2017), an idea that has broad support
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among African Americans (Crabtree, 2020). Take, for example, the
nexus between substance use dependency and criminal activity
(Vaughn et al., 2016). Individuals struggling with addiction would
receive treatment to help them overcome or manage the cravings,
ameliorating the need to engage in criminal activity. Social workers
might be involved in providing these and other services that reduce
crime (Doleac, 2018; James-Townes, 2020). Third, when problematic
behaviors do occur, alternative means would be employed to deal
with unproductive actions that threaten public safety (Vitale, 2017).
Examples in this regard include restitution-based systems of justice,
community forums for conflict resolution, and other transformative
models for dealing with problematic behaviors (Carlen & França,
2020). For instance, churches and other faith communities that have
developed peacemaking models might be encouraged to apply
them more frequently and broadly (Puls, 2017).
Although police abolition zones exist primarily at a theoretical
level at this point in time, some embryonic attempts have been
made to create police abolition zones in various locations, including
Minneapolis in the neighborhood where George Floyd was killed
(Kolls, 2020). Perhaps the most notable, or publicly visible, attempt
occurred in Seattle, with the Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone (CHAZ),
which subsequently evolved into the Capitol Hill Organized Protest
(CHOP) zone (Reeve & Guff, 2020). This experimental community
was characterized by a relatively short existence. For these and other
reasons, caution should be exercised in attempting to draw lessons
from the CHOP zone experience. Nevertheless, this experiment did
raise questions about how public safety would be protected at a
practical level when faced with people intent on perpetuating acts
of violence against innocent individuals (Reeve & Guff, 2020). The
fifth option provides one method of dealing with that issue.

Indigenizing Law Enforcement
In some neighborhoods, African Americans may favor indigenizing law enforcement. In this model, respected community
members are trained, equipped, and paid to provide public safety.
This approach is essentially a bottom-up, as opposed to top-down,
model of law enforcement (Nanes, 2017). This alternative may
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be a good fit for communities that desire personnel dedicated
to protecting public safety but do not trust traditional police
departments to achieve that aim.
Although this model has not been implemented widely in the
United States, it has been successfully employed in other nations
where minority groups have tenuous, conflict-based relationships
with the majority population (Nicholson‐Crotty et al., 2017). In
Shiite-dominated Iraq, creating police forces comprised of Sunni
members helped restore security in Sunni areas (Wilbanks &
Karsh, 2010). The indigenizing of policing in Sunni neighborhoods
fostered a change in residents’ perceptions. Instead of viewing
the state as a perpetrator of violence, residents began to perceive
the state as an agent committed to their security (Nanes, 2020a).
Similar, related findings have been observed in Israel among
the non-Jewish, primarily Arab population living in this Jewishdominated nation. Stationing non-Jewish officers in Arab districts
has been linked to increased trust among residents of these districts,
along with decreased levels of crime over the six-year time-period
examined (Nanes, 2020b). In Canada, an indigenization strategy
has been endorsed in Surrey, BC to incorporate the perspectives of
Semiahmoo First Nation people into law enforcement (Surrey Police
Board, 2020; Zytaruk, 2020) and tribal police departments have been
created on some American Indian tribal lands in the United States
(Wells, 2014).
Some nascent movement toward this model has already occurred
organically in the United States. In Minneapolis, the local NAACP
chapter issued a call for residents to protect Black neighborhoods
from the looting, fires, and destruction that engulfed much of the rest
of the city (Lee, 2020). In response to this call, a group of armed Black
men, all with professional backgrounds, formed a group called the
Minnesota Freedom Fighters (Littlefied, 2020). These citizens patrol
and protect their community, attempt to provide mentorship to youth,
and seek to deepen their ties with residents by, for example, holding
meet-and-greets (Burks, 2020). Although they have not established a
formal relationship with the Minneapolis Police Department at the
time of writing, they have established an informal relationship with
the Chief of Police and they regularly communicate with precinct
commanders (Lee, 2020). Donations are used for tactical training,
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equipment (e.g., uniforms, vests, walkie-talkies), first-responder
training, and psychological testing (Burks, 2020).
Indigenizing law enforcement in this manner represents what
might be viewed as a one manifestation of what Bent-Goodley and
Smith (2017) refer to as an African-centered approach to community
policing. Although research does not exist on the popularity of this
specific model among African Americans, its organic emergence in
Minneapolis suggests this model may garner wide support in certain
Black neighborhoods. As occurred in Iraq, state funding might be
directed to indigenous groups, such as the Minnesota Freedom
Fighters, to support their (a) mission and (b) professionalization
(Wilbanks & Karsh, 2010). Regarding the former, funding would
enable residents to leave their day-jobs and focus full-time on
protecting and serving their communities. Regarding the latter,
increased funding could be used for training to equip residents to
make the split-second decisions police officers are often called to
make in a professional, unbiased manner. The implementation of
indigenizing law enforcement models has the potential to restore
trust between African Americans and law enforcement (BentGoodley & Smith, 2017).

Practice Caveats
Social workers should be cautious about rank ordering the
alternative models of public safety presented above. In course
of depicting the various models, several cross-sectional studies
were cited to relate the views of African Americans regarding
different options that have some degree of currency in public
discourse (Crabtree, 2020; Lloyd, 2020; McDowell & Fernandez,
2018; Saad, 2020; Yglesias, 2020). Although these data are typically
nationally representative, they only relate perceptions at a single
point in time (Babbie, 2020). Accordingly, it is risky to assume
African Americans will favor one model over another based upon
cross-sectional data, as perceptions can and do change over time.
Furthermore, perceptions in one community may differ from those
in another. Consequently, it is likely more beneficial to view these
data as suggestive of possible options that can be discussed at the
community level.
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In keeping with this line of thought, it is important to bear
in mind that the five models are not necessarily discrete, but
potentially interrelated and overlapping. African Americans may
desire elements drawn from multiple models (Crabtree, 2020). For
instance, in some communities, residents may want to disband
the existing police department and redirect some of the funds to
social programs that deal with the root causes of criminal activity
(Vaughn et al., 2016). In place of the old department, residents may
desire a new, less expensive police department that emphasizes
neighborhood policing and works in conjunction with indigenous
law enforcement personnel, all operating from an Afrocentric
framework (Bent-Goodley & Smith, 2017).
In working with African Americans, the diversity that exists
among members of this population should be emphasized. While
88 percent believe that major changes to policing practices are
needed, 12 percent report that minor or no changes are required
(Crabtree, 2020). No single approach will likely be suitable for every
community. Social workers should respect this diversity and seek
to facilitate the creation of law enforcement models that reflect the
needs of the diverse communities they serve (Tice et al., 2020).
Central to this process is privileging the views of African
Americans, especially those who are vulnerable and lack the means
to voice to their perspectives. As stated in the United Nations’
(1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, African Americans
have a fundamental human right to life, liberty, and security. Law
enforcement plays a critical role in securing these foundational
human rights. Furthermore, these rights are often most salient in
lives of vulnerable African Americans. For example, older African
Americans and young mothers may be much more dependent upon
law enforcement to protect their lives, freedom of movement, and
basic security relative to young men.
This paper focuses on various public safety options that may
hold some appeal to different Black communities. Concurrently, it
is also important to note that public safety is just one of many issues
that merit attention. African Americans experience many economic,
social, and health disparities (Marsiglia & Kulis, 2016). Social
workers should not neglect these issues. Rather, they might seek
to learn from and assist churches, community organizations, and
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other local actors operating in various neighborhoods to address
these concerns.

Conclusion
Most decisions about the shape, form, and nature of public safety
are determined at the municipal level in the United States (Fisk &
Richardson, 2017). This opens opportunities to create structural
reforms that reflect the diverse needs of various Black communities
at the local level. In keeping with that goal, this paper presented
five public safety options that research suggests may have some
support among African Americans, namely reforming existing
police departments, increasing community policing, disbanding
police departments, abolishing policing, and indigenizing law
enforcement.
A central theme of this paper is that social workers should
center the views of African Americans in community practice,
particularly those who are vulnerable and living in poverty.
African Americans have a long history of oppression at the hands
of law enforcement (Taylor, 2018). Consequently, it is particularly
important that African Americans determine the public safety
models that govern their neighborhoods (Dominelli, 2018). Rather
than advocating for their own preferred model of community
safety, the social work profession should seek to advocate with and
on behalf of African Americans, using their skills to help broker a
model that fits the needs and concerns of African Americans in a
given local community.
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The present article examines the political environment in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide from the perspective of diaspora members. Research
was conducted via in-person and telephone interviews from May 2015 to
March 2016 with eight members of the Rwandan diaspora in the United
States and Canada. The primary research objective questioned how members of this particular diaspora attempt to achieve justice and reconciliation
among one another. However, current Rwandan politics became a central
discussion point during interviews, particularly the residual effect among
the diaspora. Interviews suggest that the current political climate in Rwanda may have created a culture of silence among diaspora members. Members of the diaspora appear to be hesitant to discuss potentially political and
divisive topics for fear of retaliation against themselves, their family, and
loved ones remaining in Rwanda. Furthermore, interviews suggest that
participants believe that the Rwandan government is monitoring the diaspora. This, along with the promotion of a dominant narrative regarding the
1994 genocide, has created a residual political climate in the diaspora that
hinders attempts at justice and reconciliation among members.
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Introduction
From April 1994 to July 1994, approximately 800,000 to 1 million Rwandans were murdered during a 90-day genocide between
the two predominant ethnic groups in the country, the Hutu and
the Tutsi (Gourevitch, 1998). The atrocity was largely the result of
hundreds of years of building ethnic tension exacerbated during
colonialism and fueled by the militant and anti-Tutsi-led government, both of which were also responsible for the 1959 genocide
that resulted in the death of over 20,000 Tutsi (Harrell, 2003). The
1994 genocide eliminated approximately 10–15% of the total Rwanda population (7 million), including 70% of the Tutsi population—
the overt targets of the genocide. The 1994 genocide ended when
the Rwandan Patriot Front (RPF), under the command of Paul Kagame, seized political control of the country in July 1994. Kagame
is currently serving his third term as president of Rwanda. Upon
assuming power, the RPF became responsible for addressing justice
and reconciliation in a post-genocide society. Ultimately, the RPF
responded punitively to the 100,000 people accused of genocide.
This article examines the thoughts and feelings of those who left
Rwanda directly before, during, or shortly after the genocide. Data
are sourced from telephone interviews with diaspora members from
May 2015 through March 2016. Using phenomenological methodology, we observe how diaspora members’ feelings regarding the
genocide, justice, and reconciliation are closely related to their perception of the current political climate within Rwanda. The majority
of our findings challenge the carefully crafted image propagated by
the Kagame administration regarding its role in bringing justice and
peace to the people of Rwanda in a post-genocide society. In general, qualitative data indicate that diaspora members are doubtful of
the extent to which justice and reconciliation have been achieved.
More specifically however, interviewees attach their perspectives on
post-genocide justice and reconciliation to their impression of the
current political climate—a climate they overwhelmingly characterize as punitive and oppressive. Many remain fearful. According to
the diaspora members interviewed for this study, the current political climate in Rwanda precludes justice and reconciliation through
three mechanisms: the creation of a culture of silence; the creation of
fear through monitoring; and the enforcement of a single narrative
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of the genocide. Before going into further detail on these findings,
however, it is necessary to first examine social relations in Rwanda
in the years following the genocide as they pertain to justice, ethnic
relations, and the political climate.

Post-Genocide Justice in Rwanda
Following the genocide, two institutionally-sanctioned structures were created to address issues of justice and reconciliation for
survivors: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
and gacaca (meaning grass) courts held locally throughout Rwanda
(Harrell, 2003). Gacaca courts were originally utilized in pre-colonial Rwanda as a way for communities to address crimes against its
members (Lahiri, 2009). Following the 1994 genocide, these courts
re-emerged in an attempt to address local issues in a society bereft
of a functioning judicial system. Participation in gacaca was mandated by the new Rwandan government, which categorized genocidal crimes along four levels (Harrell, 2003). Level 1 crimes included genocidal organizers, planners, those suspected of killing “with
a particular zeal and cruelty” (Hola & Nyseth Brehm, 2016, p. 62),
and those suspected of sexual crimes. Those who participated in
killings were tried for Level 2 crimes, while Level 3 crimes involved
all other acts of physical violence. Level 4 crimes referred to property crimes. Sentences for Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4 crimes were death, life
in prison, incarceration according to Rwanda’s Penal Code, and reparations, respectively. If accepted by the court, individuals convicted of Level 2 and 3 crimes could reduce their sentence in exchange
for a guilty plea (Hola & Nyseth Brehm, 2016).
While very few Rwandans participated in the ICTR, around
250,000 Rwandans participated in gacaca courts in various capacities (Hola & Nyseth Brehm, 2016). By the end of the appellate hearings in 2012, around 2 million people were tried in gacaca courts.
Both the number of cases tried by gacaca courts and the number
of Rwandans involved in the process are pointed to as proof that
justice and reconciliation have been achieved for survivors—both
victims and offenders (Haider, 2014). Importantly, however, victimhood (in the eyes of the Rwandan government) has more to do with
one’s ethnic identity than their experience with violence during
and after the 1994 genocide.
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Post-Genocide Ethnic Relations
Following the genocide, the RPF government (led by President
Paul Kagame) instituted drastic measures to eliminate any and all
notions of ethnicity, tribalism, and race ideology from public discourse (Rafti, 2004). Based upon the presupposed notion that any
discussion of ethnicity is divisive, it is illegal to even mention ethnicity and ethnic difference. Simply put, Rwanda has entered into
a state of what Vandeginste refers to as “ethnic amnesia” (Vandeginste, 2014). These measures stand in stark contrast to pre-genocide Rwanda, wherein identity cards which stated one’s ethnic affiliation (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa) were assigned to each citizen (McLean
Hilker, 2012). Because this practice assisted in the easy identification of Tutsi during the genocide, the practice has been abolished.
The use of terms such as Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are only allowed in
public discourse when they are being used to “dismiss them and
deny their salience” (Hintjens, 2008, p. 12). And yet, the practice of
labeling Rwandans continues—it simply manifests along the lines
of victim and perpetrator rather than Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. These
lines are binary, strident, and unmoving in the eyes of the law, such
that all Hutu are supposed perpetrators and all Tutsi are victims
(Goehrung, 2017).
President Kagame’s administration has played an important
role in perpetuating the notion that all Hutus were necessarily perpetrators (Goehrung, 2017; Newbury & Newbury, 1999). Under Law
No. 47/2001 and Law No. 18/2008, the RPF codified their version
of the 1994 genocide, deeming it the only credible narrative of the
genocide. Under these laws, the Rwandan government is able to
criminally sanction anyone who proffers a narrative which contradicts theirs. Again, there is little, if any, variance in who can be
considered a victim or a perpetrator. This narrative of the genocide
directly contradicts existing research which suggests as many as
300,000 Hutu were killed during the genocide either because they
attempted to protect Tutsi, or as a result of their “moderate” Hutu
status (Goehrung, 2017). Moreover, this narrative severely impacts
Hutu survivors and their family. The consequences of this binary
narrative are articulated by Goehrung (2017):
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[I]n 1998 the Survivors of Genocide Fund (FARG) was established
to pay the school fees and grant assistance to orphans of the civil war. However, the fund lends support only to Tutsi children
even in areas where violence did not occur, while children who
are Hutu, including orphans whose parents were killed by other Hutu during the genocide for being Tutsi sympathizers, are
denied assistance because they are not considered legitimate
victims. The very recognition of Hutu as legitimate victims of
violence is in fact criminalized by Rwandan law. (p. 83)

Actions such as these lead Rwandans living at home and abroad to
question the extent to which justice and reconciliation have been
achieved, ultimately contributing to an increasingly hostile political climate (Kuradusenge-McLeod, 2018).

Post-Genocide Political Climate
The relationship between ethnic relations, victim-perpetrator
status, and political climate in Rwanda are closely intertwined. The
current political landscape in Rwanda suggests an almost total authoritarian regime spearheaded by President Kagame and the RPF.
The regime is perhaps most effective due to their intense level of
monitoring regarding the activities of its citizens, journalists (both
national and international), academics, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Amnesty International, 2010).
As was stated earlier, the Tutsi-led RPF took control of the
Rwandan government in 1994, an action that ultimately led to the
official conclusion of the genocide. It is important to note, however,
that upon assuming control of the government, the RPF (aided by
supportive civilians) immediately began targeting individuals they
believed to be Hutu militants, political opponents, and civilians.
Both Amnesty International and Africa Watch reported extensive
war crimes and crimes against humanity against the Hutu people
in the months following the genocide (Reyntjens, 2011). This narrative of the genocide, however, is not sanctioned by Rwandan law,
making it difficult for Hutu victims of violence to obtain justice. On
the other hand, by excluding these facts from the official narrative,
Kagame and the RPF are able to maintain their image as the heroes who swept in and put an end to the senseless violence (Kuradusenge-McLeod, 2018).
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Once order had been restored in Rwanda in the years following
the genocide, the Kagame regime began to aggressively crack down
on free speech. One year after the genocide, almost 40 NGOs were
ejected, with 18 more getting “suspended,” largely as a result of
their vocal concern over alleged human rights violations. Additionally, an April 2001 law gave the Rwandan government the ability
to control the finances and management of both local and international non-governmental agencies. In June 2004, the Parliamentary
Commission of Inquiry on Genocide Ideology recommended banning all organizations that they believed produced speech that was
considered divisive or that promoted genocide ideology (Amnesty
International, 2010).
NGOs are not alone in being targeted by the RPF for speaking
out. Journalists and news reporters have also been identified as a
threat to the current regime and have been accused of reporting
inaccurate information and disseminating material that incites divisiveness. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have
consistently published reports regarding the lack of political transparency and human rights violations in Rwanda, and in turn have
been consistently accused by the government of producing inaccurate documents (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In August of 2008, the
Rwandan government accused both Voice of America (VOA) and
the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) of attempting to destroy
the unity of Rwandans. In early 2009, the government banned the
Kinyarwanda edition of the BBC for two months, and both BBC and
VOA were again threatened with sanctions later on that same year
(Reyntjens, 2011).
In addition to the attempts to silence journalists and discredit
research organizations, the Rwandan government has put in place
a variety of measures to limit the freedom of political expression
within Rwanda. Organic Law 2003 prohibits the political parties
from any discussion or production of information that can be
considered divisive. The main opposition party, Le Mouvement
Democratique Republicaine (LMDR) was outlawed in 2003. With
the exception of LMDR, other political parties in opposition to the
current administration are technically allowed; however, many political opponents have been placed on house arrest for accusations
of divisiveness, while others have been strategically exiled and imprisoned (Beswick, 2010).
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If this were not enough to cause concern, Kagame has successfully maintained an international image of having the overwhelming support of the people, in spite of highly doubtful election results. President Kagame won the presidential re-election in 2003 by
an overwhelming 95% of votes. In the 2008 and 2010 elections, the
RPF received over 98% of the general vote. However, it appears the
RPF-led government understood the difficulty of portraying this
astronomical number as a result of a democratic election, and they
reduced the number to 78% during the announcement of the official
election results (Reyntjens, 2011). In August of 2010, 93% voted for
President Kagame (Amnesty International, 2010). Reyntjens (2011)
suggested, “Rwandans know well what is expected of them” (p.
12). Although Article 101 of the Rwandan constitution states that
presidents may only hold office for two 7-year terms, Kagame successfully ran for a third term in 2017. During July 2015, both houses of Parliament voted in favor of altering the constitution so that
Kagame could remain a presidential candidate. After conducting
consultations with citizens in all 416 sectors of Rwanda, the government claimed only 10 Rwandans opposed the constitutional
amendment (News 24, 2015). Shortly after this report was submitted
to Parliament in August 2015, a constitutional amendment was approved. These topics—problems with the officially sanctioned narrative of the genocide, limitations on political dissent and freedom
of expression, and the power of Kagame and the RPF—emerged in
conversations with members of the Rwandan diaspora, individuals
who, despite their distance, keep a close eye on what has been unfolding in Rwanda since Kagame assumed power.

The Rwandan Diaspora and Residual Effects
Both during and following the genocide, a large number of Rwandans fled the country, establishing numerous diaspora throughout
the world, including in North America. According to the United
Nations Office High Commissioner for Refugees, in 2014 there were
approximately 5,600–7,700 Rwandans living in Canada and around
7,000 living in the United States, making the Rwandan diaspora in
North America modest, yet still substantial in size. According to extant literature, issues of ethnicity and politics within Rwanda often
have a residual effect on issues of ethnicity and politics experienced
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by the diaspora outside of Rwanda (Haider, 2014). Because of the
close connection to home and the level of nationalism, many members of the Rwanda diaspora believe that what occurs in Rwanda
has a residual effect, including fears (whether imagined or real) associated with speaking out about the government. Members of the
diaspora are well aware of what is going on in Rwanda regarding
the elimination of political opposition and independent media, and
this awareness does, in fact, affect them.
Anjan Sundaram (2016), for instance, demonstrates how the
Rwandan government conducts surveillance on members of the diaspora in his book Bad News: Last Journalists in a Dictatorship. Sundaram reports on Moses, a Rwandan journalist, who was pursued by
the government for his “critical reporting”:
He was to be deployed against his family, some of whom had fled
the country and were intellectuals in the Rwandan communities in Europe and America. His task would be to befriend these
aunts, uncles, cousins and nephews, and report on them to the
governmental services. It was possible that the authorities had
caught on to his activities at our program. Sending dissidents for
work abroad was a way to neutralize them. The same had happened to General Kayumba, who had been made the ambassador
to India. But here they were inflicting a double punishment on
Moses by asking him to turn on those who trusted him. (p. 121)

Indeed, diaspora members are impacted by post-genocide relations
in Rwanda to the extent that many have family remaining in the
country. Additionally, however, diaspora members are further impacted by post-genocide relations in Rwanda because the Rwandan government takes extreme care to maintain a watchful eye on
those who have left, typically in the form of perceived or actual
monitoring. Marijnen (2015) demonstrates how the presence of the
Rwandan government in Brussels negatively affects diaspora members living there. While Marijnen (2015ola) suggests that those in
the diaspora have more freedom to speak, she argues that speaking
out can come with very real consequences, including:
A trigger response from the RPF, usually in the form of the local
embassy or prominent exiles loyal to the regime. Hence, contentious Rwandan politics most often occurs beyond the territorial
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boundaries of Rwanda itself, especially on-line and in the social
media. (pp. 287–288)

According to Marijen, the Rwandan government does not see the
diaspora as an independent body that exists separate from Rwanda,
but rather sees it as an extremity of Rwanda that poses an “existential threat to its hegemonic project” (p. 292). To this end, Turner
(2013) suggests that the Rwandan diaspora is separated into three
categories by the state: members who support the works of the Kagame administration, those who remain skeptical and may be converted, and those who remain hostile toward the government and
are not capable of “rehabilitation.”
However, Marijnen (2015) outlines a more specific categorization
of the diaspora by the state as dictated by the Rwandan Diaspora
Policy. The first group includes those who fled Rwanda between
1959 and 1994 due to violence and hostility. This group is subdivided into two groups, which are designated both positive and negative. The “negative” group includes those who left Rwandan during
1959–1994 and are considered “subversive” due to spreading genocidal ideology or encouraging diaspora members to be critical of
the Rwandan government. The “positive” group includes descendants of refugees who fled Rwanda in 1959 and are frequently cited
as “victims.” They are defined by the Diaspora Policy as offspring
of those who left Rwanda for economical or other educational purposes—essentially, those that constitute the “brain drain” of Rwanda (Nmaemeka, 2007). Members of this group are highly sought
after by the Rwandan government, as they are seen as being well
positioned to contribute financially toward the rebuilding of the
country. The third and final group defined by the Diaspora Policy
includes descendants of refugees and Rwandans that are born to
foreigners. Marijnen (2015) notes that the Rwandan Diaspora Policy
publicly acknowledges that there is a lack of unity and community
cohesion among members of the diaspora, but she attributes this to
false information and the spreading of genocide ideology.
Marijnen (2015) further highlights that the lack of social cohesion among the diaspora as partially the result of ethnic boundaries.
However, she suggests that the current dominant public boundary
within the diaspora is political. They divide themselves often into
“pro-Kagame,” “anti-Kagame,” and “those that do not care” sets of
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groups (p. 297). Not surprisingly, ethnic and political boundaries
tend to be blurred. Marijnen found that while individuals among
the diaspora may work and live near those of different Rwandan
ethnicities, there still existed a deep level of mistrust, running congruently along ethnic and political lines. While they may coexist
peacefully, they are not ready to create meaningful relationships
among one another.
Indeed, preliminary research shows that members of the
Rwandan diaspora do not feel justice and reconciliation have been
achieved either for them or for those remaining in Rwanda, that
reconciliation is typically superficial at best, with very few meaningful relationships created among different ethnicities, and that as
these issues continue to exist among those in Rwanda, they have a
residual effect on those in the diaspora. More specifically, if justice
and reconciliation have not occurred in Rwanda, diaspora members
seem to believe that justice and reconciliation have not occurred for
them (Marson, 2016).

Methods
As we aim to describe the lived experience and perceptions of
members of the Rwandan diaspora, phenomenology served as our
methodological and conceptual guide. In short, phenomenology
seeks to analyze the subjective experience as it is understood, perceived, and judged by the subject of inquiry (Sokolowski, 2000). As a
result, phenomenological studies are not concerned with representativeness of the sample; rather, they are concerned with providing
rich, analytic description of individuals’ perception of reality. The
phenomenological approach was necessary in this study because
the original research questions aimed to understand: (1) how members of the diaspora attempt to facilitate justice and reconciliation
among one another; and (2) diaspora members’ perception of what
justice and reconciliation look and feel like. Put simply, we were
not interested in determining if diaspora members had reached
a consensus on whether justice and reconciliation had or had
not occurred. What we found important was the extent to which
individual diaspora members felt that justice and reconciliation had
been achieved among one another. Phenomenology created space
for acknowledging differing opinions on the nature of justice and
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reconciliation--concepts which are rather abstract and are shaped
by one’s subjective experience.
To provide rich and analytic descriptions of individuals’ perception of reality, researchers who utilize phenomenology often
interview participants multiple times, gathering large amounts of
data on a single individual (Morse, 2000). For this reason, phenomenological studies often work with smaller sample sizes in comparison to other qualitative projects (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). In total,
eight members of the Rwandan diaspora were interviewed for this
study. Six of the eight participants were interviewed twice, resulting in 20–25 hours of interviewing. Morse recommends anywhere
from six to ten participants for projects utilizing phenomenology
(Morse, 2000).
Telephone and face-to-face interviews were conducted with
eight members of the Rwandan diaspora in a variety of locations in
the United States and Canada between May 2015 and March 2016.
Participants were identified via snowball sampling and interviews
were semi-structured in nature. Three participants identified as female and five as male. Seven participants were Tutsi and one was
Hutu. Three participants were citizens or permanent residents of
Canada and five were citizens/residents of the United States. Participants varied in age from 32 years to 60 years. It is important to
note that four of the eight participants worked for the Rwandan
government and/or judiciary prior to their relocation. Within the
qualitative framework, the life-story method of interviewing was
utilized for both in-person and telephone interviews.
Interview questions were aimed at understanding interviewees’ perceptions of the gacaca system and whether they felt justice
and reconciliation had been achieved (both in the diaspora and in
Rwanda). More specifically, the semi-structured interviews asked
questions about participants’ lives in Rwanda and their experiences
during the genocide. Participants were also asked about their perception of ethnic relations in Rwanda (before, during, and after the
1994 genocide). While the original research questions were focused
on understanding participants’ perceptions of the efficacy of gacaca
courts, their feelings about gacaca were secondary to their concerns
about the present-day political climate in Rwanda. As a result, transcripts were coded for discussions of justice, reconciliation, and
gacaca, as well as President Kagame, the Rwandan government,
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monitoring by the Rwandan government, and the “culture of silence” identified by participants.
Phenomenological methodologies allowed us to pursue unexpected themes that emerged from interviews with diaspora members. Thus, although justice and reconciliation were the primary
focus of the study, when political climate and the culture of silence
emerged in conversations with interviewees, the primary focus of
the study shifted to reflect their subjective experiences. The interviews revealed a sincere belief that speaking out negatively against
Kagame can have very real consequences for Rwandans, both those
in Rwanda and those abroad. Absolute proof of this type of monitoring is unattainable. However, what is important in this study is
that participants believe this to be real.

Findings
Findings consist heavily of direct quotations from participants,
as we were best able to preserve the authenticity of the participants’
standpoints and perspectives by using their exact words. Discussion of these topics was often complex and layered with additional
commentary. Each participant was provided a pseudonym to assure anonymity.
When this research began, we expected that interviews would
center exclusively on discussions of justice and reconciliation. However, participants were unable to truly discuss justice and reconciliation without addressing the two issues that appear to impede the
process of both: Rwandan politics and how such politics have created residual ethnic contention. Previous research supports the claim
that issues of ethnicity and politics within Rwanda often have a
residual effect on issues of ethnicity and politics experienced by the
diaspora outside of Rwanda (Haider, 2014; Mohamoud, 2005; Owen,
2009). As such, interviews focused heavily on the particular issue
of Rwandan politics and its effect on the diaspora. Three prominent
themes emerged: the political culture of silence; how the diaspora
is silenced through monitoring; and the single narrative of victimhood perpetuated following the genocide.
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Culture of Silence
All eight participants agreed that the Rwandan government is
an authoritarian government, where freedom of speech was stifled.
Participants varied in the degrees of this belief, as well as in their
opinions about the utility of it. For example, while most respondents felt that President Kagame and the administration were authoritarian, Jean-Paul and Therese offered a justification as to why
this approach, to some extent, is understandable following a mass
atrocity. Jean-Paul explained:
After the genocide, the way Kagame leads made sense in my
mind. I understand him releasing hundreds of perpetrators and
killing his opponents. I could understand him putting limits on
the freedom of expression because the experience was very recent. It made sense to limit the freedom of expression, but now
we are two decades after the genocide. Now is the time to build
something that is sustainable and what is sustainable is social
creation of strong institutions. True reconciliation, true history
about what happened in Rwanda. Human rights is a vicious cycle. You kill me or you chase me out because I criticize you. Kagame is killing people because some are criticizing him.

For Jean-Paul, this approach can be justified in the early years following the genocide. At this point, however, he sees it as not “sustainable” and worries it is creating a “vicious cycle.”
Like Jean-Paul, Therese justified the authoritarian actions of the
government. Therese was 9 years old during the genocide. Her parents and siblings were killed shortly after the genocide began. Shortly after, in 1996, she was granted asylum and moved to the United
States, yet she has some family who remain in Rwanda. Whereas
Jean-Paul cannot excuse the continued actions of the RPF-led government so many years after the genocide, Therese appeared to be
more understanding:
People even going to the same park or the same church saying
“hi”, that is a miracle. I think part of that is a result of having
that strong government that doesn’t allow certain things to take
place, so I do think that from the beginning there was a need for
a strong government and a leadership that was trying to curve
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everyone’s hostile feelings. People feel that some of that strong
type of leadership needs to relax and people need to start talking
about their grievances. Some of the criticism I do agree with, honestly. But sometimes I feel like they do not take in the context
and the reality on the ground. They say the government is not
democratic and certainly there is a need for more political space.
But it is something that needs to be managed and it needs to take
place slowly in the right space because it is something people are
just not ready for.

Therese worries that without the “strong type of leadership” that
currently exists, it would be impossible to “curve everyone’s hostile
feelings.”
Pierre is another participant who feels that a certain degree of
monitoring and control is necessary. Pierre was 39 years of age when
the genocide occurred. He and his wife survived, but his parents
and in-laws did not. He worked as a minister and a teacher in Kigali
until he relocated to the United States in 2003. Of all participants,
Pierre was the most supportive of President Kagame and the tactics
utilized by the government. Pierre agreed that there was extensive
control by the government, but justified such actions, as he felt Rwandans were “difficult” to govern. Pierre explained much of President
Kagame’s governing style as a result of his life experiences:
If we had a president with a civilian background, he would take
things differently but beginning where he (Kagame) begun, his
background makes him who he is. The military wants their subject to do according to what the officers say so that is the type of
leadership that is evolving there. A lot of it is positive; at least on
the whole there has been security. However, at one point people
fear that there is too much policing [laughs]. So you don’t know.

Even with justifications from participants such as Jean-Paul, Pierre,
and Therese, all respondents spoke of the culture of silence among
those in Rwanda and how Rwandans tend to be hesitant to speak
out publicly about any potentially divisive topics. This may be
attributed to the non-political cultural norm in Rwanda that discourages citizens from speaking about sensitive or political topics,
something participants referred to throughout our conversations
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with them. However, interviews suggest that the cultural norm is
highly exacerbated by the current administration.
In addition, participants typically spoke of Rwandan politics
and what is happening in Rwanda first, and then spoke of how
such issues affect and exist among the diaspora. Participants, to
varying degrees, discussed the authoritarian nature of the current
Rwandan government (most notably, President Kagame). Participants suggested that this authoritarian government had fostered
a culture of silence among those in Rwanda and residually among
the diaspora. In other words, participants suggested that the majority of Rwandans, both in Rwanda and the diaspora, are afraid to
speak honestly and publicly about anything political and politically
divisive (re: justice and reconciliation), for fear that the Rwandan
government may harm them or their families. This culture of silence also included discussion of monitoring among the diaspora,
as well as a single narrative that exists both in Rwanda and among
the diaspora.
Paul, a once prominent legal figure in Rwanda, was the first
participant interviewed for this study. He clearly discussed the negative perceptions of the current Rwandan administration among
the diaspora. When discussing what life may be like in Rwanda
currently, he stated:
The problem is not among Hutu and Tutsi. The problem is under
the dictatorship that is there. The Hutu and Tutsi are suffering
together. President Kagame’s problem is that he likes to maintain
his power.

Paul suggested that the ultimate goal of the Kagame administration was not to provide justice for Rwandans, but to exert political
power by ensuring citizens are afraid to speak. As indicated in the
quotation above, Paul believed that this affects both Hutu and Tutsi negatively. While Paul acknowledged problems with ethnicity,
he felt that the real problem lies in the Rwandan government, not
among the continued (yet informal) separation by ethnicity.
Another participant, Marc, worked closely with President Kagame for six years and ultimately left Rwanda because he became
vocal against the government and their policies. Because of his outspokenness, Marc feared for his life and fled first to South Africa
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and then to Canada. When discussing fear and silence in Rwanda
and the current administration, he stated:
One of the things with this regime is that it is very hard-core. The
(government) threatens, it is very careful about spreading fear.
There is a reason why it is successful—part of it explains why
there was genocide. It was genocide of neighbour against neighbour—the character of Rwandan people is that you obey. So when
you are ordered, you do and you do not question.

Jean-Paul, a former attorney in Rwanda who worked closely with
gacaca courts, also spoke to the culture of silence among those in
Rwanda. Because of the legal ramifications of talking publicly about
ethnic identity, he suggested there is still deep suspicion among
Hutu and Tutsi, but few speak of it. Contrary to Paul, who felt that
there is no palpable conflict among Hutu and Tutsi, Jean-Paul believed that this forced silence creates more animosity among ethnic
groups, creating a “tinderbox” of anger.
Joseph, in agreement with Paul’s perception, went into detail
regarding politics in Rwanda. For most of his adult life, Joseph
worked in governmental positions in Rwanda prior to his relocation to Canada. This included a high-ranking economic position
that resulted in his assignment to the Office of the President. He
suggested that the culture of silence created a distinct, yet inaccurate, portrait of Rwanda to the world:
I’ll tell you this. Everyone knows who stays in Rwanda. Sometimes we choose to stay silent. You may see the outer picture, but
it’s not the country that you actually see the way it is. The inside
of the country, what goes on in the leadership, is not what people
know about Rwanda. You may know some things. It does not
reflect reality.

Joseph elaborated by discussing the involvement of the government
in his occupation. He stated that there were times during his tenure
with the Office of the President that the administration wanted to
push a particular developmental goal:
It is going to be a problem for you if you disagree. You are going
to be told to say and write certain things. Then, that narrative is
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what goes out in the world. The truth is the country does have a
lot of things happening. People have gained a new sense of life. If
you want to have peace in Rwanda, make sure you don’t involve
yourself in politics. You don’t criticize the government, you do
whatever you are told to do and don’t question that or you are
going to have things happen to you.

Joseph has family remaining in Rwanda with whom he communicates frequently. He stated the fear that he has of the administration
did not dissipate when he left Rwanda, as there are ramifications
for those who remain if someone they know well (e.g., family member, close friend) speaks out against the government:
You cannot discuss politics at all. You can discuss family, how
you are doing, but you cannot mention politics. It has happened
to one of my sisters-in-law. We talked about political things and
then she mentioned to me that they can’t say anything and they
have to watch what they say. We ended our conversation and the
following day she was picked up and taken to the police. Our conversation had been tapped and she was asked to elaborate more
on everything she discussed with me. They took her to jail for one
month and three weeks.

For Joseph, the arrest and incarceration of his sister-in-law confirmed his suspicion that the culture of silence would be enforced
by the Rwandan government.
Marc’s narrative was similar to Joseph’s. He felt that his family members who remained in Rwanda were unable to speak with
him because of his vocal opposition to the Kagame administration.
For Marc’s family, there existed a belief that there would be consequences should they engage with him:
I had a sister here in Canada who would not even talk to me
because of the regime there. About three months ago I lost my
mother in Rwanda but they can’t talk to me and I can’t talk to
them—we can’t even talk. That’s how it is.

In this quote, Marc indicates that the culture of silence within
Rwanda has residual effects on those living in the diaspora. Indeed,
although both Marc and his sister reside in the diaspora, neither
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feel comfortable conversing with one another because of his history
of voicing dissent.
Monique, a participant who not only lived through the genocide but also witnessed the execution of her father and brothers,
relocated to the United States in 2001. Throughout her interview
she discussed the fear members of the diaspora—as well as those
in Rwanda—experienced when speaking to one another via telephone. She outlined her general belief about this issue, as well as
her own experience when calling her mother. She noted that it was
not simply concern regarding the monitoring of phone calls by authorities—she also feared informal surveillance by regular citizens
who might overhear a conversation:
I know that this happens. People are still cautious when talking
on the phone. There are people who can’t bring up anything and
that’s just a normal thing. Even if it’s not about criticizing the government, they are worried…they don’t want to discuss certain
things on the phone.
For instance, for my mom and my sister…I know there are things
that I can’t bring up or I just don’t talk about. I have never brought
up anything political. We know that we cannot talk on the phone
about these things. You don’t bring it up if you don’t want anyone
to hear because you don’t know what can be taken out of context.
You don’t want anything to be taken out of context.

Monique’s perception that the culture of silence will be enforced
is so strong that she has become wary of any speech that could be
“taken out of context.”
When asked his thoughts on why people were so afraid of the
Kagame regime and the RPF-led government, Jean-Paul explained:
They are afraid of the consequences or the repercussions of their
(gacaca) statements. They are afraid of the government. Everything is monitored from the top level of the government to the
lowest level of administration. Everything is monitored and people have to be silent.

The quote above echoes sentiments expressed by both Joseph and
Paul. While Jean-Paul is speaking specifically about gacaca, his

40

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

supports the general theme that the administration may have silenced Rwandans, both during and after gacaca proceedings. JeanPaul also worked with researchers in attempts to understand the effectiveness of gacaca and how Rwandans felt about the process:
They are not free to speak about anything. I and other researchers
went to deep villages in Rwanda and ask people what they think
about gacaca. Everyone from Ruhengeri to Butare speak the same
language, “Gacaca is good, and everything is good! We thank the
president Kagame, we thank our leaders.” That was the same language. Very few people tell you, “Okay, if you want me to tell
you what I believe, you should grant me anonymity…” Very few
speak their mind, very few because of the regime in place and
because there is still suspicion.

The hesitancy among Rwandans to “speak their mind” extended to
civic engagement. Later in the interview, Jean-Paul explained that
during his time volunteering as a commissioner for the 2003 election, there was fear among citizens that their ballots were not confidential. According to Jean-Paul, voters worried about what might
happen to them if they did not vote for President Kagame. From a
phenomenological standpoint, it is not important whether or not
citizens’ votes were actually being tracked and monitored by the
RPF; the perception of some that this could happen was enough to
instill fear. Marie felt similarly.
Marie was 6 years old during the Rwandan genocide. Her father worked as a government official and was killed shortly after
the genocide began. She relocated with her family, first to Belgium
and then to the United States. Marie supported statements made by
other participants, suggesting that the Rwandan government has
created a culture of silence among Rwandans in an attempt to instill a sense of fear:
A lot of people silence themselves because we are afraid of the
consequence of what may happen. Once the government was able
to establish a sense of fear it makes you think that they are watching us even though they can’t watch everyone all the time. I was
reading a few months ago that, after the genocide it takes about
five generations to reconstruct a stable society, to reconcile with
what happened. We are starting the second generation in Rwanda
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and things are not getting better. We distrust each other. Even
among Hutus we don’t trust each other because of the silence culture. Among Hutus and Tutsis, it’s even worse.

Although Marie realizes that it is impossible for the Rwandan government to surveil all members of the diaspora at all times, the
fear is enough to create a culture of silence and sow distrust, even
among the diaspora.
Similar to Marie, Monique stated that she believed that people
were afraid to speak publicly about certain issues for fear of retribution by the government. On the other hand, she is different from
Marie in that she views the diaspora as being more “open” in terms
of expressing their dissent than those who remain in Rwanda:
I think that to some extent, people are afraid to talk. Normally
we don’t talk about things very much, about the things that may
put you into trouble. In Rwanda people have managed to find
a way to see that there are things you can’t talk about and just
leave it alone. We are opening up here (diaspora) more than we
are in Rwanda.. For survivors in Rwanda, they feel like the only
way to live peacefully is just to go along with what is going on
in the country, so just forget about the stuff. Because I’m here,
I’m not sure 100% if people disappear because of what they have
said and so forth. For survivors, I know there are some of them
that have been killed coming from gacaca courts and nobody has
followed up about these survivors getting killed and the disappearance. I know for some survivors after the gacaca court were
getting killed. But, unfortunately there are things that I hear but
I am not sure 100%.

Monique’s perception that the diaspora is willing to “[open] up
more” may be influenced by her skepticism regarding the veracity
of the stories she hears about what is going on in Rwanda.
The authoritarian nature of the Kagame administration is
known throughout academe, as are its implications on justice and
reconciliation in Rwanda (Clark, 2014; Hintjens, 2008; Ryentjens,
2011). Rwandans appear to tell two stories—one that has political
approval and state sponsorship, and one that they speak of while
looking over their shoulders. It is therefore difficult to make definitive claims regarding what is—or is not—occurring in Rwanda.
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However, participants’ statements, as outlined above, suggest that
what is occurring in Rwanda, whether real or imagined, impacts
the lives of diaspora members. Importantly, six out of eight participants spent the majority of their lives in Rwanda and had distinct
experiences regarding the political climate within the country. Because of the deep connection with their home country, including
previous residency, members of the diaspora are keenly aware of
what occurs in Rwanda and have very particular opinions and beliefs regarding these events (Marijnen, 2015).
Promoting Silence through Monitoring
As some of the quotes above indicate, the culture of silence appears to transcend the physical location of Rwanda and spills over
into the diaspora in the United States and Canada. For this reason,
even securing interviews for this research proved difficult. Members of the diaspora were afraid to speak, believing that their statements would become public knowledge and/or that the Rwandan
government would find out. These fears appeared to be partially
a result of the perceived level of monitoring among the diaspora,
which respondents felt could have very real consequences for them,
as well as for their family members remaining in Rwanda. When
discussing this with Paul, he stated:
I know it’s not easy (finding participants) because they don’t
know who the person is and they don’t know what the person is
going to do with their testimony. People are sort of scared of the
government so it is not easy to get many people to talk.

Marc was not surprised by the difficulty in securing participants
and stated, “It’s because they are afraid, so I’m actually surprised
you were able to find anybody (to talk with).” Marc believed that
even among the diaspora, Rwandans were afraid to speak publicly
about anything that might be considered negative against President
Kagame. Marc stated that there is a very real belief among the diaspora that what they say publicly might reach the ears of the Rwandan administration.
When discussing the fear among the diaspora of President Kagame, Joseph stated:
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The only reason I am trusting you right now is because I know that
you are handling this like a professional, but I have to be cautious
when discussing this with fellow Rwandans who I don’t trust. We
know how our government works; they have agents everywhere.

Joseph stated he believed the diaspora in Canada was actually monitored by the Rwandan government. He reported being approached
by the government to monitor the diaspora when he moved to Canada. Joseph was unwilling to do so, but many others were:
I have friends that are watched by police in hiding positions.
There are officers all around. For example, if you say something
about the government and the person whom you disclosed to
texts an intelligence officer, they take it back to the government. If
you happen to go back to Rwanda, this is how you may not come
back. They will arrest you and keep you there. (Because of this),
they (the diaspora) may not disclose anything about their government for fear of repercussions. It may come to bite them when
they go to Rwanda.

Marie also acknowledged the monitoring of the diaspora. When discussing the fear of monitoring among the diaspora, she shared a salient example from her personal experience as a diaspora member.
When Marie first arrived in the United States, she attempted
to participate in diaspora-based activities. She noticed that most
Rwandans in her area were Tutsi, and she tried to create activities
that encouraged Hutu to participate as well:
First, I got some emails…threatening emails from people who
worked at the embassy. I went to a conference and someone came
and he pretty much—he kind of pushed me around in front of everybody saying how I was promoting genocide ideology myself.
I was followed a couple times and I tried to put together a conference about the policy situation in Rwanda. I wanted to invite a
couple scholars on Rwanda. But among the scholars of Rwandan
government they are not approved. They are pretty much blacklisted. That also got me into trouble.
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She continued:
I had a class with someone who works at the embassy. At one
point we were supposed to present and he brought a couple people from the embassy with him. They kind of made me understand that I better not say anything that wasn’t appropriate for
our people.

Out of all eight participants, it appeared that Marc had the most
intense belief regarding the monitoring of the diaspora. This is
largely a result of his former occupational ties with the Rwandan
government, as well as his outspoken nature about political topics.
Marc was followed and monitored in South Africa, and he believes
that this action of the Rwandan government continued when he
relocated to Canada:
I first experienced that in South Africa. That is why I left, because
I could no longer sleep in my own house because of fear. So, of
course I’m aware of what happens. I cannot bear to sit at an event
with Rwandans I don’t know—they wouldn’t have me anyway
because I am an ’enemy of the state,’ as they call it.

Additionally, Marie’s family in Belgium were deeply afraid that she may
be hurt by those working for President Kagame in the United States.
They were most afraid that her research would make her a target:
It’s actually one of the main concerns I, and my family, had when
I was writing and talking about Rwandan politics. They were
saying, ‘Make sure we know where you are and where you are
going. Have someone, and a faculty member, with your emergency contact information.’ They were right, as I was getting phone
calls and letters when I was doing my research. I’m away from
Rwanda and I’m still young. I haven’t made any remarkable contributions but I still get threatening letters from people who were
trying to influence me.

Marie felt that these phone calls were a direct result of her vocal
opposition to the Kagame administration, which resulted from her
academic research on the Rwandan diaspora in Belgium. She did
not disclose the specific content of these phone calls or emails.

The Rwandan Diaspora

45

When Monique discussed the possibility of diaspora members
being monitored, she agreed that it happens, but that it depends on
where someone is and what they speak about. While acknowledging the possibility of monitoring, she also said that she hoped that
this would change, as people needed to speak openly about their
feelings:
I think there are people who are followed, but it depends on where
you are. There are people who are very cautious. It depends on
who you are talking to, because there are times when you can say
things, but you don’t know who else is there. I know that happens
to some people. It has happened to people who have left Rwanda.
I used to worry about what I say. I don’t talk politics. I talk about
women’s issues. I care about those kinds of things. In the private
places or in conversation, you have to be able to open up about
certain things and tell people what you feel. Sometimes I feel like
it’s very scary. But sometimes it will be helpful for you to hear
perspective from different people and if it is taken in a good way
it can help. I hope that will change. We will see what happens.

Monique also discussed that this fear leads to Rwandans not being
interested in speaking with researchers. She informed me that it
was very rare for Rwandans to be willing to speak out about potentially political and divisive topics, and that no one would speak
without guaranteed confidentiality.
Joseph and Marc each discussed something very specific about
the monitoring of both those who remained in Rwanda and those
who relocated to Canada. There appears to be a very precise monitoring form utilized in Rwanda that may also be utilized in the
diaspora. Joseph elaborated on how this system appears:
Rwanda’s administration system, here is how monitoring works.
For example, every ten houses must have a RPF leader. One individual is in charge of those ten houses and communicates to the
government what is going on there. If the President is in the area
or something is happening, the leader must make sure that all the
ten people are there.
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Marc discussed this “10 house system” as well, but suggested that it
is not just applied in Rwanda, but is also utilized among the diaspora:
Do you know how the system works in Rwanda? The smallest unit
there is the one in charge of ten houses. It means that every village, every block, is organized as a unit of government so if anything happens in those ten houses it is reported. So you have the
smallest ten houses which are cells, then provinces, then districts,
and all of those are spy levels. It is how the government tracks
everyone’s house. It’s here (in the diaspora) too. Every grouping
has a mechanism of reporting. The next thing you know, if you
move to another house, the ambassador calls the ambassador in
Rwanda and then he tells Kagame.

Jean-Paul discussed the monitoring that occurs in Rwanda. However, he was less certain that this happens among the diaspora.
Interestingly, his narrative regarding monitoring also touches on
lack of reconciliation among the diaspora, precisely because diaspora-based organizations may be seen as instruments of the Kagame
administration:
I do not have any facts about that (monitoring in the diaspora). I
am aware though that few people participate in Rwandan diaspora associations here (the United States) and in Europe because
they mistrust those associations. Those who are believed to be
pro-RPF are the only ones that participate. This is why it’s rare
to see strong campaigns that bring together Rwandan diaspora
living here, in Canada, and in Europe. There is a big suspicion
and mistrust between Rwandans in the diaspora based primarily
on the past history of genocide and political support or opposition of the current government. The formal Rwandan diaspora
associations were established by the Rwandan embassies. Those
who are active in those associations often get involved as a way
of targeting political positions in the government or any other job.

Neither Pierre nor Therese talked about monitoring among the diaspora. This finding was not entirely surprising, as they appeared
to be the most supportive (or at least expressed neutrality) of President Kagame and the RPF government. With both participants, this
topic was broached, and both quickly replied that they did not want
to discuss this type of political topic.

The Rwandan Diaspora

47

When asking respondents why they felt the Rwandan government worked so hard to create fear and silence among those in
Rwanda as well as the diaspora, the answers were varied. Some
suggested that it was a necessity to ensure that genocidal ideology
did not occur. Numerous participants suggested that it was done so
that President Kagame could maintain his stranglehold of political
power. Others suggested that the culture of fear was used to essentially create one approved post-genocidal narrative—a narrative
that paints all Hutu as perpetrators and all Tutsi as survivors.

Single Narrative
Legally, the elimination of ethnic categories has been utilized
as a form of social reconstruction following the genocide (Hintjens,
2008). Rwandans are no longer allowed to publicly identify as Hutu,
Tutsi, or Twa. This specific type of identification is considered divisive under Rwandan law, and penalties for such public identification can result in imprisonment. However, a new form of labelling
exists in Rwanda. Instead of identifying oneself by ethnicity, Rwandans now are classified as “perpetrator” or “survivor.”
However, it appears that it is a commonly held assumption
among both those in Rwanda and those in the diaspora that Hutu
are categorized as perpetrators/offenders and Tutsi are categorized
as survivors. This particular label appears to be a way to create a single, government-approved narrative about who did what during the
genocide. Five participants spoke specifically of a single narrative.
Marie was perhaps the most vocal about the single narrative created by the administration, likely because she identifies as an ethnic
Hutu. Moreover, her family died as a direct result of their moderate
political ideology and their refusal to commit genocidal acts:
The Hutus disappeared out of the genocide and it just became
Tutsi. You are like, what happened to all the moderate Hutu who
actually died saving Tutsi? They had family members who should
be recognized. Looking at my family, the oldest member of my
family is only 39 years old. He’s the oldest member and I’m like,
so what happened to the rest of them? What can’t I speak publicly that they were victims? That’s something I’ve been struggling with for so long, because the issue is saying that only the
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minority group were victims and everyone else wasn’t a victim.
They (politicians, President Kagame specifically) are sending a
message. They are not looking for justice and reconciliation; what
they are looking for is approval of their narrative itself. They are
not trying to bring people back together.

Joseph, a Tutsi, also suggested a single narrative exists in Rwanda.
It was audibly clear how angry it made him that only Tutsi were allowed to be survivors and Hutu perpetrators, particularly because
he had Tutsi family members that killed Hutu. He provided a particular example:
I am going to give you an example, my own brothers. I know that
my cousin’s brother went to the place where our grandfather and
my uncle’s wife and six kids were killed. They decided to kill every Hutu that was in that area as revenge. These were Hutu that
were killed and innocent people. I ask them sometimes why they
killed these people and they ask me why they killed our people.
There are so many incidents like that, so this single narrative is
just a joke.

Jean-Paul also discussed the inaccuracy of the single narrative, based
specifically on the number of those who died during the genocide.
When we talk about a million people killed in Rwanda, we didn’t
have a million Tutsi in Rwanda! That means the numbers that are
accumulating like that are also the bodies of Hutu. Some of us
have weaknesses and have hid bodies of the Hutus being killed
and buried in masses because the UN was going to come and
investigate the reported murder—the narrative makes it worse.

Marc outlined a single narrative that exists both in Rwanda and in
the diaspora and hinders reconciliation in both locations. He suggested that Hutu are essentially forced to ask for forgiveness, even
if they did not participate in the genocide:
Reconciliation has not happened because Kagame has divided
us—it’s confusing because on one hand they say ’we are Rwandans!’ On the other, he has told the Hutu to ask for forgiveness.
There is a program in Rwanda that asks Hutu to denounce what
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they did and ask for forgiveness which assumes all Hutu are perpetrators, even children—which is contradictory.

Paul outlined a single narrative, but did so in a somewhat indirect
manner. He spoke of his occupation and how as a Chief Judge he
was asked to render judgment on a variety of cases. Part of the reason that Paul left Rwanda was that he felt the government wanted
him to disperse judgment on one type of offender, Hutu. Paul spoke
frequently of the difficulty he had being an officer of the law and
not technically being permitted to hold certain Tutsi or RPF members accountable for their crimes. Furthermore, he suggested that
those with political and economic connections to the RPF were not
held accountable for their crimes. For Paul, this violated his moral
and ethical standards.
This narrative has been successfully incorporated into society,
as evidenced by respondents’ statements and current Rwandan
laws. Five respondents spoke of the single narrative that exists in
Rwanda, and suggested that this type of narrative hinders attempts
at justice and reconciliation among those in Rwanda. Again, it appears the single narrative that exists in Rwanda has a residual effect on the diaspora. All respondents reported first that justice and
reconciliation have not fully occurred in Rwanda, due to the imposition of a single narrative that transcends the borders of Rwanda.
The presence of this narrative created silence, and because of this
silence, Rwandans are not free to truly express their feelings regarding the genocide or discuss how it affected them.

Summary and Discussion
All eight participants discussed, in varying levels of detail, current Rwandan politics and more specifically, the culture of silence
they create. Seven out of eight participants spoke of personal experiences they, or their family members, had that supported such
claims. All eight participants stated that President Kagame and the
RPF-led administration governed Rwanda in an authoritarian fashion, which severely limited freedom of speech. This belief that the
Rwandan government has a stranglehold on freedom of speech,
and passes laws with severe consequences for ambiguous “divisive” speech and action, is supported by both academic literature
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and non-governmental publications (Amnesty International, 2010;
Beswick, 2010; Vandeginste, 2014). Participants, however, varied in
their beliefs regarding the appropriateness of such actions.
Respondents had conflicted opinions of President Kagame. While
acknowledging the positive economic and infrastructure changes
the Kagame administration has achieved, participants were also well
versed in the authoritarian nature of his administration. Six participants outlined very strong feelings about the Rwandan government
and its control and believed that this severely hindered attempts at
justice and reconciliation for those in Rwanda. For these participants,
the lack of honest public discourse combined with a fear of the government made issues associated with ethnicity worse and created a
culture where Rwandans, both in country and in the diaspora, were
afraid to speak publicly about a variety of topics.
The culture of silence appears to have a residual effect on the
diaspora, most notably through the perception that it is monitored
by Rwandan government officials, or by Rwandans who will report back. Participants suggest that this culture creates a sense of
silence and fear among them, understanding that public statements
may have consequences for them and for their families remaining
in Rwanda.
Regarding participants’ belief that their movements in the diaspora were being monitored by the RPF, Reyntjens (2011) and
Hintjens (2008) suggest that if monitoring does exist, it is probably
directed at those members of the diaspora who are considered political, divisive, or dissenters. Reyntjens (2011) argued that some are
more likely to be monitored than others, particularly those who are
considered dangerous, usually by participation in political activism, previous governmental work in Rwanda, or level of intimacy
(inside knowledge) with the Rwandan government. Based on previous employment and current activities, it is likely that five participants would be considered dissenters.
Because the topic of “monitoring” was unexpected, the first author spent considerable time discussing with participants why they
felt it happened. More specifically, the first author explored why they
felt President Kagame ruled so authoritatively and how this control
extended to the diaspora. Responses varied, with no real consensus
among participants. However, one general theme appeared that was
not anticipated—the single narrative. Five participants spoke of this,
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indicating that they believed the push to impart and reinforce this narrative was a large driver of the tactics of the Rwandan government.
It is known that many Hutu died during the genocide as a result
of their moderate political stance and for their attempts to rescue
and protect Tutsi. However, the five participants made clear that
this was in violation with the national narrative that President Kagame has created around the genocide. While the Rwandan government now professes that ethnicity and ethnic differences do not
exist, with public ethnic identification being illegal, a new labelling
system has replaced it. This system indicates quite clearly that only
Tutsi may be considered as survivors of the genocide and Hutu are
named as perpetrators. To be clear, by highlighting participants’
perceptions that the RPF does not allow for a multiplicity of experiences concerning the 1994 genocide we are not suggesting a “double
genocide” took place in Rwanda—one against the Tutsi minority
in 1994 and a second against the Hutus. Indeed, such claims have
been made and have been found to lack empirical support (Strauss,
2019). Similar to Strauss—and in line with the perceptions of our
participants—we endeavor to draw attention to the limitations of
reductionist and binary thinking about the violence in Rwanda.
Political silence exists in Rwanda, and to a lesser extent among
the diaspora. There is a layer of “opaqueness” that exists, which impedes our understanding of the situation. While speech in the diaspora is stifled, it appears that more honest conversations can exist
there than in Rwanda. Thus, understanding the diaspora may help
us more clearly understand what may be occurring in Rwanda.
Future research on diaspora populations should consider the
cyclical nature of the relationship between the home country and
the diaspora. It is important to acknowledge not only how political
issues occurring in home countries affect their diaspora populations, but how diaspora populations can also influence and affect
home countries. Participants suggested that there is an underlying political narrative which exists among the diaspora. It may be
that, as suggested by participants, there are also issues of divisiveness within ethnicities as they begin to take “pro-Kagame” and
“anti-government” stances. Future research may address this issue
more specifically, focusing on political beliefs of participants. These
beliefs may work as an additional source of contention among the
diaspora or may possibly serve in the process of unification.
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Methodological Issues/Limitations of Research
Because of methodological issues inherent in the research design, findings from this study should not be used to draw conclusions about genocide survivors or diaspora members outside of this
sample. While snowball sampling was an appropriate way in which
to conduct a study of this nature, it was clearly not without its issues. Snowball sampling is susceptible to selection bias, as initial
gatekeepers and all participants may have entirely different experiences and notions of ethnic division and potential divisiveness
compared to those who were not part of this research. Indeed, all
participants were well-educated men and women, and four of them
worked within the judiciary or in high level positions within the
government. These positions and identities ultimately impact their
experiences during the 1994 genocide and, thus, their perception
of events. Put simply, it is likely the experiences and perceptions of
well-educated, highly-skilled Rwandans in the diaspora are very
different from those who do not have the same educational or vocational backgrounds. It should be noted, however, that the majority
of the participants shared similar beliefs regarding the genocide
and current political climate in Rwanda, regardless of their age,
ethnicity, or gender. Many Rwandans who are members of the diaspora may have similar qualifications, as these qualifications make it
easier to immigrate.
Moreover, participants who agreed to participate in this study
may be inherently different than those who elected not to, or those
we were unable to reach. Members of the diaspora who were willing to share their stories might have completely different life-stories
and ideas about justice and reconciliation than those who did not
participate. We also attempted (via contact with participants and
lengthy internet searches) to identify members of the alleged “extremist” diaspora. We were unable to locate any members of such
diaspora groups that wished to participate in this research. Future
research should attempt to document the experiences of these individuals and examine their perception of the political climate in
post-genocide Rwanda. Researchers should also consider exploring
whether or not the lived experiences of Rwandan diaspora members are similar to those of other populations who have been displaced by violence, such as political refugees and asylum seekers,
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in general. Such an investigation would provide meaningful insight on the extent to which political dissent, the notion of a single
narrative, and fear of surveillance are common among populations
of people displaced by violence.
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In 2019, plasma centers in the United States received a record 53.5 million
blood donations, roughly triple that collected during the Great Recession.
Recent ethnographic research and journalistic accounts connect plasma sales
and poverty, an association that would carry important public health implications given the vulnerability of disadvantaged populations. This study is
the first to examine a range of socioeconomic characteristics of communities
where commercial plasma centers situate. We geocode locations of all U.S.
commercial plasma centers and merge with census tract demographic data
from the American Community Survey. Findings indicate greater odds that
plasma centers will locate in urban tracts with high rates of deep poverty,
poverty, and near poverty. There is a bivariate association with high percentages of residents identifying as Black and Hispanic. These findings indicate
a clear interrelationship between persistent economic hardship and the raw
material sustaining a major healthcare industry.
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In 2019, plasma centers in the United States received a record
53.5 million paid plasma donations, roughly three times than what
was recovered during the Great Recession. (Plasma Protein Therapeutics Association, 2011, 2019). The number of plasma donation
centers have expanded from fewer than 300 in 2005 to over 900 in
2020, supporting a growing industry that was worth $4 billion in
2008, $21 billion in 2016, and is forecast to reach $48 billion by 2025
(Hotchko & Robert, 2018; Market Research Bureau, 2020; Mitchum,
2008; U.S. Food and Drug Administration [FDA], 2020; Wellington,
2014). Ethnographic research and journalistic accounts suggest that
a key motivating factor fueling plasma donation in the U.S. is the
financial compensation associated with the transaction (Edin &
Shaefer, 2015; Goldstein, 2017; Guendelsberger, 2019; Kretzmann,
1992; Tirado, 2014; Valiente et. al., 2017).
These accounts suggest that paid plasma donation has become
a common economic coping strategy among Americans with low
incomes, who over the past decades have experienced: high rates of
poverty and hardship; steep increases in the costs of essential expenses; declines of the cash safety net; and a corresponding rise in
extreme poverty (Edin & Shaefer, 2015; Valiente et.al., 2017; Wellington, 2014; Woolf et. al., 2006). Because U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations permit American donors to sell plasma
up to twice a week (U.S. FDA, 2019), these donations can add a few
hundred dollars a month to household income, an important source
of economic support for low-income families.
Despite the large growth in plasma donations since the Great
Recession, recent literature has not examined the demographic
characteristics of the growing number of plasma donors, reportedly
low-income Americans who are already prone to poor health outcomes (National Center for Health Statistics, 2012). Such evidence
would hold clear public health implications, particularly given the
limited evidence on the impact of plasma donation on donor health.
In the absence of publicly available data on the characteristics of
plasma donors, this study examines the socioeconomic characteristics of the communities where plasma centers are situated.
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Background
Plasma donation, or plasmapheresis, is a procedure that involves
the extraction of plasma from the blood for the use of medical therapies. The plasma exclusively extracted from voluntary donors is
known as source plasma, defined by the FDA as the fluid portion of
human blood intended as source material for further manufacturing use (U.S. FDA, 2019). Plasma is used in medical therapies called
plasma protein therapies (PPT) (Market Research Bureau, 2018).
These therapies primarily benefit patients suffering from rare diseases (namely antibody deficiencies) and hemophiliacs (Farrugia &
Robert, 2006).
As worldwide demand for plasma-derived therapies has expanded, so has the presence of plasma centers across the U.S. (Hotchko & Robert, 2018). The global plasma industry relies heavily on
U.S. donors, because the U.S. holds the least restrictive plasma regulations in the world (Hotchko & Robert, 2018; Robert, 2017). A single U.S. donor can yield far more donations than in any other country because most countries limit plasma donation to once every 2
weeks and prohibit paid donation (The Lancet Haematology, 2017). In
2016, the United States accounted for 74% of the world’s source plasma supply, while North America accounted for 44 percent of the
demand (Hotchko & Robert, 2018; Robert, 2017), meaning plasma
from U.S. donors is used all across the world.
Figure 1 charts total paid plasma donations in the United States
by year, 1999–2019. While the number of donations remained steady
between 1999 and 2005—with some slight counter-cyclical variation—donations began to increase rapidly starting after 2006, quadrupling by 2018.
Health Implications of Plasma Donation
The limited evidence available on the impact of plasma donation on donor health focuses on: (1) the linkage between plasma donation and distribution of risk behaviors associated with
transfusion-transmissible infections; and (2) donor physiological
health implications. In an earlier paper examining the location of
commercial plasma centers in the U.S. from the period 1980–1995
relative to geographic distribution of risk behaviors, Robert C.
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Figure 1: US Source Plasma Collections 1999–2019
Source: Plasma Protein Therapeutics Association 2011 and 2019
James and Cameron Mustard (2004) found that commercial plasma
centers were overrepresented in neighborhoods with very active
drug economies. These neighborhoods had high concentrations of
households in deep poverty—with incomes below half the official
poverty threshold. That this pattern persisted even after contaminated plasma products had infected thousands of patients with
HIV and Hepatitis C was an alarming finding (HIV and Hepatitis C
testing was not readily available during this time period). Technological advancements since the 1990s that introduced viral inactivation techniques during the production of plasma derivatives manufactured from paid donors have made blood products safer for
patients (World Health Organization, 2004). However, ethnographic research and journalistic accounts of plasma donors suggest that
plasma donation is still primarily undertaken by vulnerable populations (Edin & Shaefer, 2015; Valiente et. al., 2017).
With regards to the impacts of plasma donation on donor health,
short-term side effects such as fatigue, tingling sensations, anemia,
and black outs have been chronicled in firsthand accounts published
in The New York Times, The Atlantic, and Huffington Post (Greenberg,
2019; McCollum, 2020; Wellington, 2014). Additional physiological
implications were examined in a 1994 study that sought to determine
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whether long-term plasma donation altered plasma proteins or lymphocyte phenotypes (Lewis et al., 1994). The authors found that
plasma donors had increased percentages of B cells as compared to
non-donor controls and whole blood donors. The authors hypothesized that the increase in B cells may be a compensatory mechanism
to make more immunoglobulin to replace what was lost in plasmapheresis, suggesting physiological consequences to plasma donation.
Another study found that performance in exhaustive, severe-intensity exercise was “markedly reduced immediately following the removal of plasma. The only likely explanation is that anaerobic energy pathways must have been compromised” (Hill et. al., 2013, p. 554).
This study measured time to exhaustion before and after plasma donation at different time intervals. The authors noted that while performance declined initially, performance levels were re-established
thereafter. However, because each participant only donated plasma
once during this study, possible consequences of repeated withdrawals could not be determined.
A 2010 study investigating the long-term effects of plasma donation in the United States found that high frequency U.S. plasma
donors had fewer proteins in their blood when compared to European plasma donors (Hellstern et al., 2001). In this study, all subjects were regular plasmapheresis donors over a period of at least
6 weeks. The median interval between two plasma donations was
5 days among U.S. donors and 14 days along German donors. The
results indicate that plasma collected from frequent donors yielded
lower quality plasma.
In another study that examined the risk of iron depletion among
frequent plasma donors, the authors found that frequent source
plasma donation in the U.S. did not adversely impact iron stores
(Schreiber et al., 2018). However, donor samples were taken once
at the beginning of the donor’s routine plasma donation instead of
after, and the period of time between which the donor had last given plasma and the sample was not considered. These factors lead
to questions about the validity of the results of this study. It is also
important to note that the study was a collaborative effort between
the Plasma Protein Therapeutics Association and other leaders in
the plasma industry.
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Data and Statistical Methods
To examine the association between the location of plasmapheresis centers and the demographic characteristics of the surrounding
communities, the addresses of active (as of May 2017) FDA-approved
plasmapheresis centers were geocoded and analyzed in 2017–2019
in conjunction with Census tract level data from the American
Community Survey (ACS) (2011–2015 5-year estimates) using ArcGIS. The ACS is a nationally-representative household survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that randomly samples addresses
in every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The ACS is
the primary source of data for the socio-economic characteristics of
small units of geography (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). In addition, to
provide a population density measure, primary rural-urban commuting area (RUCA) codes classifications were incorporated in our
data set. RUCA codes classify U.S. census tracts using measures of
population density, urbanization, and daily commuting. Primary
codes range from a whole number scale of 1–10 to delineate metropolitan, micropolitan, small town, and rural commuting areas. The
RUCA codes used in this study are from the 2010 decennial census.
Plasma center addresses were retrieved from the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration’s Blood Establishment Registration Database
in May 2017 (U.S. FDA, 2017). Geocoding these addresses revealed
638 locations throughout the continental United States. Of these
centers, eight were not-for-profit establishments and one was located in a tract with no population. These nine centers were dropped
from the dataset. Our data consists of the remaining addresses of
629 commercial plasmapheresis centers. Data were sorted into two
groups: (1) Census tracts with plasma centers; and (2) Census tracts
without plasma centers. There were initially 72,065 census tracts in
our data set. Of these, 331 tracts were dropped because they had no
population, 473 tracts were omitted because they had unreported
poverty data, and an additional two tracts were dropped because
they were missing data on educational attainment. This left 71,590
census tracts. Of these, 617 census tracts had plasma centers and
70,973 did not.
Two sample t-tests were used to assess statistical significance of
differences in selected characteristics. Logistic regression was then
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employed to estimate the association of community characteristics—
such as racial and ethnic composition, educational attainment, poverty status, and population density—with the presence of a plasma
center in that community. The outcome variable indicated whether
or not a plasma center existed in the census tract (1 = yes, 0 = no).
Race and ethnicity were measured using the following variables
from the ACS: total percent White alone, total percent non-Hispanic
black, total percent Hispanic, and total percent other (this is the aggregate of all categories other than non-Hispanic black and Hispanic). The educational attainment variable was measured using the
following variables, as a proportion of the census tract population:
level of education less than high school, level of education more
than high school and some college, and Bachelor’s degree of more.
Poverty was measured by variables of the proportion of people living below cash incomes of 50% of the poverty line, 50–99.9%, and
100–200% of the poverty line. Population density was measured by
a dichotomous variable constructed from 2010 RUCA codes. RUCA
codes 1–3 denote metropolitan areas, 4–6 denote micropolitan areas, 7–9 denote small towns, and 10 denotes rural areas. We created
an urban variable which categorizes RUCA codes 1–3 as urban (urban = 1) and codes 4–10 as not urban (urban = 0). Lastly, a variable
for state was included in model 3 to control for underlying state
characteristics.

Results
Figure 2 plots the locations of commercial plasmapheresis centers in the continental United States. Concentrations of plasma centers exist in the South and Midwest. As per FDA blood establishment registration records, Texas had the highest number of active
plasma centers of any state in the United States (84), with many
along the southern border, followed by Florida (47). The upper
Northeast and West regions exhibited lower concentrations.
Results from Table 1 indicate that 597 census tracts with plasma
centers are located in urban areas and 20 are located in rural areas.
While 96.8 percent of plasma centers are located in urban areas, only
82.0 percent of all census tracts in the United States are urban. Another primary difference between the two groups of census tracts is
in the concentration of racial and ethnic minorities. Non-Hispanic
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Figure 2: Location of plasma centers and proportion of county population living below 100% poverty level
Blacks make up 21.5 percent of the population in census tracts with
plasma centers, compared to 13.4 percent of those without plasma
centers. The results are similar for Hispanic origin. In contrast,
while 50.8 percent of residents in census tracts with plasma centers are non-Hispanic White, the proportion of non-Hispanic White
residents is 12 percentage points higher in census tracts without
plasma centers at 62.8.
The differences are not as striking by educational attainment, although they move in the hypothesized direction. A somewhat larger
proportion of residents in census tracts with plasma centers had not
graduated from high school (16.8 percent versus 13.7 percent) and
correspondingly a somewhat lower fraction had a bachelor’s degree
(29.0 percent versus 23.9 percent). The rates of high school degree attainment and some college are roughly comparable.
Those living in census tracts with plasma centers were also
more likely to live in poverty, most noticeably deep poverty, below
50% of the poverty line, and below 100% of the poverty line. While
on average 7.3 percent of the population residing in census tracts
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Table 1. Selected Socio-economic Characteristics for Census Tracts
with and without plasma centers (Means)
No plasma centers

With plasma centers

Standard
Standard
Deviation
Deviation Mean
.386
.968

Standard
Standard
Deviation
Deviation t
.177
-9.6*

Characteristics
Urban (dichotomous)

Mean
.818

Race and Ethnicity
Non-Hispanic White
Non-Hispanic Black
Hispanic
Other

62.8
13.4
16.1
7.8

30.0
21.7
21.3
10.2

50.8
21.5
20.7
6.9

28.6
25.1
24.7
6.1

9.9*
-9.3*
-5.4*
2.0*

Educational Attainment
< High School
HS, Some college, No BA
Bachelor’s degree +

13.7
57.3
29.0

11.0
14.3
18.8

16.8
59.3
23.9

11.7
10.8
14.6

-7.0*
-3.5*
6.8*

7.3
8.9
19.0
64.8

7.0
7.1
9.4
18.9

12.0
13.4
23.8
50.8

10.0
7.9
8.3
18.9

-16.7*
-15.6*
-12.7*
18.4*

Income-to-Poverty
< 50% poverty
50 to <100% poverty
101 to 199% poverty
>200% poverty
* p<0.05 or beyond

Source: Census tract data retrieved from ACS 2011-2015 (5-year estimates) and plasma
center addresses retrieved from FDA Blood Establishment Registration Database on May
31, 2017
Notes: Table 1 compares the socio-economic characteristics for census tracts with and
without plasma centers. The table shows statistically significant results at p=0.5 for all
selected socioeconomic characteristics.
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without plasma centers live below half the poverty line, 12.0 percent of those in census tracts with plasma centers did so, a figure
64 percent higher. The rate of residents between 50 and 100% of
poverty was 51 percent higher in tracts with a plasma center than
in tracts without plasma centers.
Table 2 reports the results from three multivariate logistic regression models that estimate the odds that a plasma center will be
located in a census tract. Census tracts are the unit of observation,
and the dichotomous outcome is equal to 1 if there is a plasma center in the census tract, and 0 if there are no plasma centers present. Model 1 includes poverty, race and ethnicity variables. Model
2 adds educational attainment, and model 3 includes all variables
in the previous models, adds a variable indicating urbanicity, and
controls for states to adjust for underlying state characteristics. State
coefficients have been omitted from the table. In each model, standard errors are clustered by state.
The odds ratios for all the poverty variables (below 50% poverty,
50–99% and 100–200%) in each model are substantively meaningful
and all are statistically significant at p<0.01 across all three model
variations; the odds of finding a plasma center in census tracts is
positively associated with the proportion of individuals living in
deep poverty, poverty, and near poverty. Odds ratios for all three
levels of poverty are roughly similar in magnitude.
With regard to race and ethnicity, when income-to-poverty
variables and race and ethnicity are entered into the same model,
the bivariate differences seen by race and ethnicity in Table 1 are
not evident. In no model is the percentage of Black non-Hispanic
population associated with greater odds of a plasma center. In
model three, the odds of a plasma center are somewhat higher and
are statistically significant for the percent Hispanic only. Thus, of
the inter-related factors of community-level poverty rates and composition by race and ethnicity, poverty appears to be the stronger
predictor in these models.
Interestingly, the odds associated with higher levels of educational attainment (percent high school and/or some college and percent more than BA) are above one, and are statistically significant at
above the .001 level. In models two and three, the odds of finding a
plasma center in areas where a greater proportion of the population
has some college as well as a bachelor’s degree are greater when
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Table 2: Odds Ratios From Logistic Regression Models: Predicting
the Association of Characteristics of Communities With Presence of
aTable
Plasma
Center
That
Community
2: Odds
RatiosIn
From
Logistic
Regression Models: Predicting the Association
of Characteristics of Communities With Presence of a Plasma Center In That Community
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
Income-to-Poverty
Percent Poverty <50%

1.040***
(.003)

1.043***
(.003)

1.040***
(.003)

Percent Poverty 50–99%

1.032***
(.005)

1.053***
(.006)

1.044***
(.006)

Percent Poverty 100–200%

1.035***
(.006)

1.053***
(.005)

1.045***
(.005)

Percent Black non-Hispanic

1.001
(.002)

1.003
(.002)

1.001
(.001)

Percent Hispanic

0.999
(.006)

1.010
(.006)

1.013***
(.004)

Percent Other

0.997
(.008)

0.994
(.009)

1.008
(.004)

Percent HS and/or Some College

---

1.045***
(.006)

1.033***
(.007)

Percent More than BA

---

1.050***
(.006)

1.033***
(.006)

Race and Ethnicity

Education

Urban/Rural Designation
Urban

---

---

9.297***
(2.105)

State controls

---

---

X

Constant

0.002

.00002

.00002

Observations
71,590
71,590
68,372
*** p<0.001, **p<0.01, * p<0.05
Reference category for income-to-poverty is percent poverty >200%
Reference category for race and ethnicity is White non-Hispanic
Reference category for educational attainment is percent < high school
Reference category for urban is percent rural
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
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compared to the fraction with less than a high school degree. Thus,
after controlling for income-to-poverty and race and ethnicity, the
odds of a plasma center being located in a community is positively associated with educational attainment. Finally, given that 96.8
percent of plasma centers in the U.S. are located in urban census
tracts, the odds ratio for the urban variable is large and statistically
significant beyond the .001 level.

Discussion
This study establishes that there is a clear linkage between the
location of plasma centers in the United States—the most important
market for the industry—and the presence of disadvantage. Census
tracts with higher levels of individuals just above the poverty line,
as well as higher levels of individuals in poverty and deep poverty,
were most likely to have a plasma center. In the absence of data on
the demographic characteristics of the actual people who sell their
blood plasma, this study expands our understanding of the characteristics of the people who are most likely to donate plasma—those
who are poor. This finding allows researchers to begin to interrogate the impact of plasma donation on the donor population, an
area of research that remains largely unexplored. Interestingly, in
multivariate models, economic deprivation appears to be a stronger
predictor of the location of plasma centers than does the race or
ethnicity of those living in a particular census tract.
Counter-intuitively, however, higher levels of education are
associated with greater odds of a plasma center being located in a
particular community, after controlling for the level of poverty and
other factors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that low-income student
populations are likely to engage in plasma donations. It may be that
plasma centers are more likely to be located in areas where there are
campuses with lower levels of economic resources. However, further
investigation of these issues—preferably with individual level data—
is warranted.
An understanding of the donor population carries compelling
public health implications because evidence on the short- and longterm health repercussions experienced by plasma donors is largely
absent from the literature. Because likely donors are presumably
poor, additional evidence on the impact of plasma donation on

68

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

vulnerable bodies must be considered. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic highlights the vulnerability of poor Americans, whose social
and environmental circumstances have historically led to worse
health outcomes (Abrams & Szefler, 2020; Raifman & Raifman,
2020). This is due to a range of factors, from decreased access to
health care services to an increased likelihood of experiencing
chronic health conditions (Adler & Newman, 2002).
Pharmaceutical companies that manufacture and profit from the
sale of plasma protein therapies have little incentive to investigate
this line of inquiry further; their focus is on the patient, not the donor. While there is an abundance of scholarship that examines the
benefits of plasma-derived products for patients, deeper examination of how plasma donation impacts purveyors of the raw material
that patients and pharmaceutical companies depend on is equally
important. However, the privatized nature of the pharmaceutical
industry hinders access to donor data, hampering efforts for independent research in this area. Still, generating this kind of data is
paramount to ensuring that low-income donors are not inadvertently
debilitating their bodies in an effort to combat their poverty.
In the absence of evidence examining the ramifications of plasma donation to donor health, we encourage policymakers to consider the ethical implications of the reliance of low-income Americans
on plasma donations. To safeguard the well-being of likely donors,
policymakers should continue to expand policies that have sought
to mitigate the rise in hardship during the COV I D pandemic, such
as the 2021 expansion of the child tax credit.

References
Adler, N. E., & Newman, K. (2002). Socioeconomic disparities in health:
Pathways and policies. Health Affairs, 21(2), 60-76. https://doi.org/10.1377/
hlthaff.21.2.60
Abrams, E. M. & Szefler, S. J. (2020). COVID-19 and the impact of social determinants of health. The Lancet Respiratory Medicine. Advance online
publication. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2213-2600(20)30234-4
Edin, K. J., & Shaefer, H. L. (2015). $2.00 a day: Living on almost nothing in
America. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Blood Plasma and Poverty

69

Farrugia, A., & Robert, P. (2006). Plasma protein therapies: Current and future perspectives. Best Practice and Research Clinical Hematology, 19(1),
243–258. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beha.2005.01.002
Goldstein, A. (2017). Janesville: An American story. Simon and Schuster.
Greenberg, Z. (2019, February 1). What is the blood of a poor person
worth? The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/sunday-review/blood-plasma-industry.html#:~:text=A%20donation%20
of%20plasma%2C%20for,the%20UCLA%20School%20of%20Medicine.
Guendelsberger, E. (2019). On the clock: What low-wage work did to me and
how it drives America insane. Little, Brown and Company.
Hellstern, P., Bach, J., Haubelt, H., Hitzler, W. E., Mathis, S., & Vogt, A.
(2001). The impact of the intensity of serial automated plasmapheresis
and the speed of deep‐freezing on the quality of plasma. Transfusion,
41(12), 1601–1605. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1537-2995.2001.41121601.x
Hill, D. W., Vingren, J. L., & Burdette, S. D. (2013). Effect of plasma donation and blood donation on aerobic and anaerobic responses in exhaustive, severe-intensity exercise. Applied Physiology, Nutrition, and
Metabolism, 38(5), 551–557. https://doi.org/10.1139/apnm-2012-0361
Hotchko, M., & Robert, P. (2018). Recent market status and trends of
fractionated plasma products. Annals of Blood, 3(2), 19. https://dx.doi.
org/10.21037/aob.2018.01.06
James, R. C., & Mustard, C. A. (2004). Geographic location of commercial plasma donation clinics in the United States, 1980-1995. American Journal of Public Health, 94(7), 1224–1229. https://doi.org/10.2105/
AJPH.94.7.1224
Kretzmann, M. (1992). Bad blood: The moral stigmatization of paid plasma donors. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 20(4), 416–441. https://
doi.org/10.1177/089124192020004002
Lewis, S. L., Kutvirt, S. G., Bonner, P. N., & Simon, T. L. (1994). Plasma proteins and lymphocyte phenotypes in long-term plasma donors. Transfusion, 34(7), 578-585. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1537-2995.1994.34794330011.x
Market Research Bureau. (2018). Plasma procurement and safety. https://
marketingresearchbureau.com/plasma-industry/current-uses-affecting-the-plasma-industry/
Market Research Bureau. (2020). Blood plasma market by product (immunoglobulin, albumin, protease inhibitors, coagulation factor concentrates); By
application (hospitals, and clinics, research laboratories, Academic institutions) and by regional analysis—global forecast by 2021–2026. https://www.
marketresearchengine.com/blood-plasma-market
McCollum, N. (2020, April 15). I’m desperate for money due to coronavirus, so I donated plasma. It was alarming. HuffPost. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
covid-19-plasma-treatment-donation_n_5e9484e0c5b6d97d91f0c3da

70

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Mitchum, R. (2008, November 20). In weak economy, plasma centers pulsate with donors seeking dollars. The Pantagraph. https://www.pantagraph.com/news/in-weak-economy-plasma-centers-pulsate-with-donors-seeking-dollars/article_e8c9e3b3-f93f-58db-8ee5-9451e097f38e.
html?mode=comments
National Center for Health Statistics. (2012). Health, United States, 2011:
With special feature on socioeconomic status. https://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/hus/hus11.pdf
Plasma Protein Therapeutics Association. (2011). United States total donations 1999–2011.
Plasma Protein Therapeutics Association. (2019). United States total collections 2008–2019.
Raifman, M. A., & Raifman, J. R. (2020). Disparities in the population at risk
of severe illness from COVID-19 by race/ethnicity and income. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 59(1), 137–139. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
amepre.2020.04.003
Robert, P. (2017). Setting the scene for the future of blood and plasma donations. IPFA/BCA 3rd Global Symposium, Atlanta, GA, September
11–12, 2017.
Schreiber, G. B., Brinser, R., Rosa-Bray, M., Yu, Z. F., & Simon, T. (2018). Frequent source plasma donors are not at risk of iron depletion: The ferritin levels in plasma donor (FLIPD) study. Transfusion, 58(4), 951–959.
https://doi.org/10.1111/trf.14489.
Schwartz, N., D., Casselman, B., & Koeze, E. (2020, May 8). How bad is
unemployment? ”Literally off the charts“ The New York Times. https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/05/08/business/economy/apriljobs-report.html
Shaefer, H. L., Edin, K., Fusaro, V., & Wu, P. (2019). The decline of cash assistance and the well-being of poor households with children. Social
Forces, 98(3), 1000–1025. https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soz020
The Lancet Haematology. (2017). Editorial: The big business of blood plasma. 4(10), E452. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2352-3026(17)30183-7”
Tirado, L. (2014). Hand to mouth: Living in bootstrap America. Penguin Books.
U.S. Census Bureau. (2018). American community survey information guide. https://
www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/about/information-guide.html
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (2017). Blood establishment registration
database.
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (2020). Blood establishment registration
database. https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cber/CFAppsPub/

Blood Plasma and Poverty

71

U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (2019). CFR—Code of Federal Regulations Title 21 Part 640.65. Retrieved June 14, 2020, from https://www.
accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRSearch.cfm?fr=640.65
World Health Organization. (2004). Annex 4: Guidelines on viral inactivation
and removal procedures intended to assure the viral safety of human blood
plasma products. (WHO Technical Report, Series No. 924).
Wellington, D. L. (2014, May 28). The twisted business of donating plasma. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/05/
blood-money-the-twisted-business- of-donating-plasma/362012/
Woolf, S., Johnson, R., & Geiger, J. (2006). The rising prevalence of severe
poverty in America: A growing threat to public health. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 31(4), 332-341. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2006.06.022
World Bank. (2020, June 8). COVID-19 to plunge global economy into worst recession since World War II [Press Release]. https://www.worldbank.org/
en/news/press-release/2020/06/08/covid-19-to-plunge-global-economy-into-worst-recession-since-world-war-ii
Valiente, A. Abdelmalek, M, & Pearle, L. (2017, January 13). Why thousands of
low-income Americans ”donate“ their blood plasma to for-profit centers
ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/US/thousands-low-income-americans-donate-blood-plasma-profit/story?id=44710257

Understanding How Recipients of
Means-Tested Government Assistance
Decide Not to Vote and How Social
Workers Can Make a Difference?
Adelaide K. Sandler
Marist College

When voter turnout of any one particular demographic or social group
is significantly less than that of other groups, members of that group lose
their power to protect their basic economic and social rights. Low voter
turnout among recipients of means-tested government assistance is especially problematic because election outcomes impact the benefits on which
they depend. This article presents results from a qualitative study to understand how recipients of means-tested government assistance decide to
vote or not to vote. Four themes emerged related to the patterns of voting
behaviors and described as: dedicated voter, voter, nonvoter, and dedicated
nonvoter. Each one bases their decision-making about voting on different
factors. Therefore, a variety of interventions are needed to encourage voting
by all. This article seeks to share the voices, experiences, and perspectives
of recipients of means-tested government assistance, in order to inform and
improve social work interventions to increase voting. 				
			
Keywords: voting, welfare, social work, social policy, political attitudes,
empowerment

Introduction
A defining feature of social work is the profession’s focus on individual well-being in a social context. The profession’s foundation
rests on its commitment to the fit between person-and-environment,
which is influenced by social policy enacted by politicians elected
by citizens. Therefore, voting is an essential catalyst to impact social
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare • June, 2021 • Volume XLVIII • Number 2

72

Voting Decisions

73

policy and has the potential to improve environmental/structural
forces that impact the well-being of individuals. Voting is recognized as a basic right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
because it allows citizens to influence governmental decision making about policies to protect their economic and social rights and to
ensure their basic needs (housing, food, healthcare, education, and
safety) are met (Wonka, 2015).
However, the profession has struggled with how to incorporate
practices to increase voter turnout and encourage strategic voting
in order to protect the policy interests of populations served by social workers (Abramovitz et al., 2019). Despite social workers’ efforts
to increase voter participation, voter turnout in national, state, and
local elections in the United States has declined over the past fifty
years (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). This should be alarming to social workers committed to social and economic justice. Low voter
participation, particularly of marginalized populations, reduces
democracy and responsive governmental solutions to problems of
those who typically do not vote (Bartels, 2008; Campbell, 2007; Frasure & Williams, 2009; Piven, 2011; Verba et al., 1995).

Importance of Voting for Recipients
of Means-Tested Government Assistance
Who votes is important in determining the priorities of politicians and government policy. Voters are more likely to be older,
non-Hispanic whites, college-educated, and have higher incomes
than nonvoters (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). Voters and nonvoters
have very different attitudes about the role of government and
policy concerns. According to McElwee (2015), nonvoters are more
likely to support government aid to the poor, free community college, and raising the minimum wage. Voting blocs with lower voter
turnout rates lose influence over elected officials to represent their
groups’ interests and needs (Leighley & Nagler, 2014; Piven & Cloward, 2000). Generally, political parties and candidates do not even
mobilize those known not to vote (Pew Research Center, 2017).
In the 2016 United States Presidential Election, close to 100 million eligible voters did not vote, representing 43% of all eligible voters
and a greater number of those who cast a ballot for either candidate
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(Amandi et al., 2020). Imagine the power this group would have if
they voted on Election Day. Franko, Kelley, and Witko (2016) suggest
if lower-income citizens voted at similar rates as other citizens, governmental assistance might be more responsive, resulting in greater
equality and access to services by marginalized populations. Who
votes matters because politicians (elected by wealthy citizens, PACs,
and lobbyists) enact policies that maintain the status quo, benefit
the rich, and stigmatize those with lower-incomes. As a result, higher-income citizens feel valued, which reinforces their voting behavior, and lower-income citizens feel alienated, which reinforces their
non-voting behavior, thus perpetuating the political cycle that leads
to inequality (Hacker et al., 2007; Leighley & Nagler, 2014).
The “transformative” power of “everybody voting” is illustrated by data that shows politicians are more likely to increase spending on programs that benefit lower-income populations when they
vote in higher percentages (Franko et al., 2016; Larcinese, 2007).
This is especially evident when considering differences between
how states distribute welfare funds. States with the highest voter
turnout levels among lower-income voters tend to make fewer budget cuts to welfare spending and institute less restrictive welfare
policies than states with lower levels of voter turnout by lower-income populations (Avery & Peffley, 2005; McElwee, 2015). Similarly, in municipalities with higher voter turnout, there is greater
spending on government assistance (Hajnai, 2010). These examples
underscore the pertinence of this study to improving the general
welfare of populations served by the social work profession.
Because the income of those who receive means-tested government assistance depends on elected officials’ actions, it is especially harmful when this group has low voter turnout. Unlike broadbased/universal programs (G. I. Bill, Medicare, and Social Security),
means-tested benefits are increased only when elected officials take
political action to increase them. For example, since the 1970s, the
value of food stamps (SNAP) and welfare (AFDC and TANF) has
been reduced significantly (Hacker et al., 2007), and stricter limits to eligibility have been put in place. Most recently, the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) increased work
requirements for able-bodied adults with no dependents, which is
especially alarming in the midst of the Covid-19 health crisis and
growing unemployment (Reiley, 2019).
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Despite the importance of voting by those who rely on meanstested government assistance, most research about voting is located
in political science literature that emphasizes quantitative methods
to identify demographic factors related to voting. Statistical data
and analysis have not discerned within-group differences between
those recipients of means-tested assistance who vote and those who
do not vote, which is vital for social workers to understand when
designing interventions to increase voting. Social work literature
focused on civic engagement and increasing the profession’s awareness of political participation mentions voting; however, few social
work articles solely focus on voting. No voting-related research has
been conducted from the perspective of recipients of means-tested
assistance. Without a complete understanding of how these citizens
decide to cast a ballot or not, efforts to increase voter turnout often
fail (Rolfe, 2013). This research begins to fill this gap by including
the voices of recipients of means-tested assistance to understand
why and how they decide to vote on Election Day.

Literature Review
Eligible voters who receive means-tested government assistance
are less likely to cast a ballot in any election than those who receive
non-means-tested universal government assistance (Piven & Cloward, 2000). The stigmatization of the “identity” of being a recipient
of a means-tested government program creates political inequality
beyond differences related to socioeconomic status and educational
levels (Piven & Cloward, 2000; Swartz et al., 2009). Because the elite
perceive poverty to be the result of individual failures, not structural ones, means-tested programs are viewed as a “handout” and
structured to direct behaviors and limit eligibility to keep people
from getting assistance (Hacker et al., 2007; Trattner, 1999). This
is in sharp contrast to non-means-tested government assistance
programs such as social security, Medicare, earned income tax deductions, tax deductions for property owners, and corporate subsidies (Abramowitz, 2001; Badger & Ingram, 2015; Bandow, 2018;
Hacker et al., 2007). Notably, these programs’ recipients tend to be
older, wealthier, more educated, white, and have the highest levels
of voter turnout (File, 2017; Pew Research Center, 2014; Verba et. al.,
1995). Because of the inadequate government safety-net to provide
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for all citizens’ basic needs, recipients of means-tested assistance
are less likely to vote, even when they have stopped receiving benefits (Swartz et al., 2009).
In addition, the stigmatization of recipients of means-tested
assistance is disseminated by the media which “create and maintain the political interests of dominant social groups” (Bullock et
al., 2001, p. 243). News coverage about poverty is focused more on
ending welfare dependency, than on the context of poverty or its
structural causes (Bullock et al., 2001). These negative images are
especially harmful to Black Indigenous People of Color (BIPOC)
and women (Sparks, 2006). Gilens (2006) found that news about
poverty and social welfare policy was more likely to highlight African Americans than white European descendants, wrongly giving
the impression that poverty is associated only with BIPOC communities. This perpetuates racial stereotypes, racializes welfare policy,
and lessens public support for adequate governmental assistance
(Avery & Peffley, 2006; Gilens, 2006; Clawson & Trice, 2000). Additionally, the images of welfare recipients as (a) “welfare queens,”
(b) mothers having more babies to collect more welfare benefits,
(c) irresponsible mothers who leave their children to go to work,
and (d) single mothers who are either immoral for having sex out
of wed-lock or overbearing and responsible for driving their husbands away, lead the public to believe that women are to be blamed
for poverty, instead of the structural inequality (Sparks, 2006).
These racist and sexist stereotypes link social welfare policy
with implicit racial stereotypes of laziness and dependency (Winter, 2008), which are used by elected officials (Brockwell, 2019) to
limit government spending on assistance to the poor (Hero, 2006;
Johnson, 2006; Schram et al., 2006). For example, the racial composition of a state’s welfare rolls can be used to predict how that state
will manage its TANF block grant allocations (Fording, 2006; Soss
et al., 2006). States with more racially diverse populations are more
likely to adopt stricter work requirements, time limits, and policies
to regulate personal behavior, such as drug-testing (Avery & Peffley
2005, Fording, 2006, Soss et al., 2001).
Like social welfare policy, voting policy is impacted by racial bias
(Epperly et al., 2020). The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution
was enacted in 1870 to give African Americans the right to vote. Still,
states adopted voting restrictions such as the grandfather clause,
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poll-taxes, literary tests, exclusions of African Americans from voting in all-white primary elections, purges of African Americans
from the voting rolls, disenfranchisement of former prisoners, and
violence to stop newly enfranchised African Americans from voting (Brooker, n.d.; Epperly et al., 2020). To combat these restrictions,
the Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965. Section five of the Voting
Rights Act included the “coverage formula,” which required states
with voter registration and voter turnout rates less than fifty percent to get federal approval to change their voting laws. Section five
impacted nine states—Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia—and counties
in California, Florida, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota (United States Department of Justice, 2020). In 2013, the Supreme
Court decision of Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder ruled that section
five of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional. This ruling allowed states previously limited by section five of the Voting Rights
Act to change their state’s voting laws without federal approval. As
a result, many of these states changed polling places’ locations, added strict photo identification requirements, limited early voting, and
redistricted (Newkirk, 2018; The Formula Behind the Voting Rights
Act, 2013). These changes impose Jim Crow-era voting restrictions
designed to suppress the vote of BIPOC populations and individuals with low incomes (Brooker n.d.; Epperly et al., 2020; Hajnal et al.,
2017). These changes are dangerous for recipients of means-tested
government assistance because voting impacts social welfare policy,
and thus their income.
In addition, since the 1980’s millions of BIPOC populations have
lost their right to vote because of a felony conviction (Uggen et al.,
2020). As stated by Alexander (2020) this is “due in large part to
a racially biased, brutal drug war” (Alexander, 2020). Despite recent reforms to end felony disenfranchisement, in 2020 5.2 million
Americans, which is 2.3 percent of the voting-age population, lost
the right to vote (Uggen et al., 2020). Kendi (2019) laments the connection between voting and social policy:
It is becoming harder for people of color to vote out of office
the politicians crafting these policies [health care], designed
to shorten their lives. Racist voting policy has evolved from
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disenfranchising by Jim Crow voting laws to disenfranchising by
mass incarceration and strict voter-ID laws. (p. 22)

Racism is embedded into the criminal justice system, the political
system, and social welfare policies, all of which maintain structural
inequality (Hero, 2006; Kendi, 2019) and fuels voters’ apathy (Piven
& Cloward, 2000; Solt, 2008).
In 1983 social worker Richard A. Cloward and sociologist Francis Fox Piven founded Human SERVE at the Columbia School of
Social Work to reduce barriers to voting (Piven & Minnite, 2008).
Its goal was to mobilize social workers and social work students to
register voters and participate in related Get out the vote (GOTV)
activities through the National Association of Social Work (NASW)
and schools of social work. As a result, seven million new voters
were registered to vote, yet voter turnout in the 1984 Presidential
election declined (Piven & Cloward, 2000). This prompted Human
SERVE to lobby for legislation to modernize voter registration and
allow agencies serving BIPOC and low-income populations to register voters (Piven & Cloward, 2000). With the mobilization of other
social service agencies, the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)
of 1993 was passed by Congress and signed into law by President
Bill Clinton on May 20, 1993. This legislation is commonly referred
to as the Motor Voter Law because it allows citizens to register to
vote when applying for a driver’s license or any federal social service, including TANF, SNAP, and WIC. Since its passage, several
states challenged the law, but the courts upheld its constitutionality
(Piven & Minnite, 2013, United States Department of Justice, 2019).
Despite this victory, the United States Department of Justice continues to litigate against states not in compliance with the law.
Since 1995, the Nancy A. Humphrey’s Institute for Political
Social Work (NAHIPSW) has collaborated with the University of
Connecticut’s School of Social Work and field agencies to expand
non-partisan voter engagement projects. More recently, in 2016, The
National Social Work Voter Mobilization Campaign was formed to
“integrate non-partisan voter engagement into social work education and practice” (Voting is social work, n.d.). Despite these efforts,
there is more work to be done.
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Empowerment
An empowerment perspective guides the profession of social work to improve individual and community functioning and
promote “social justice and a reduction of social inequality” (Gutierrez, 1994, p. 4). Empowerment uses an ethno-conscious framework, rejects the individual fallacy assumption that individuals are
to blame for their circumstances, and adopts the ecological perspective (Lee, 1996), the unifying paradigm for social work (Robbins et
al., 2012).
The definition of empowerment includes three levels: individual, interpersonal, and political, which “together work toward assisting individuals to develop a sense of personal power, an ability to
influence others, and an ability to work with others to change social
institutions” (Gutiérrez, 1994, p. 204). The individual (intrapersonal)
level of empowerment involves perceived control; self-efficacy; motivations to control (i.e., civic duty, concern for the common good,
and sense of connectedness); and perceived competence or skill to
act (Gutierrez, 1994; Zimmerman, 1995). Perceptions of social isolation, powerlessness, normlessness, helplessness, and alienation are
thought to be negatively associated with intrapersonal elements of
empowerment (Zimmerman, 1995). The focus of the interpersonal/
interactional level of empowerment is understanding one’s relationship and position in the social environment, understanding the nature of social-political issues, and understanding power structures
(Gutierrez, 1994; Zimmerman, 1995). Lastly, the political component
involves the interest, motivations, and behaviors of an individual to
influence political structural change to improve conditions for the
group with which they identify (Gutierrez, 1995). Each of these levels was considered in understanding the nature of how recipients
of means-tested government assistance make voting decisions and
decide to vote or not.

Methodology
The purpose of this study was to examine how recipients of
means-tested social welfare programs make decisions about voting.
Data was collected using a grounded theory approach to generate
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knowledge about why some recipients of means-tested assistance
vote and others choose not to vote. One-on-one interviews provided a nuanced look into their decision-making that is not possible in
survey research and elevated the participant to an “expert” status,
which is less possible in focus groups. Most importantly, it provided
an outlet for the voices of participants to be heard, congruent with
the ethical basis of social work to promote social justice and empower vulnerable populations.
Participants were recruited in 2015 from three community colleges in a northeastern state, one each from an urban, rural, and
suburban location. Community colleges were used to recruit participants for two reasons. First, more than 40% of all community
college students or their families meet eligibility requirements for
means-tested programs (Ma & Baum, 2016). Second, by using a
college setting for recruitment, the variable of education could be
controlled. This is important because education is correlated with
voting (Beaumont, 2011; Hillygus, 2005; Ozymy, 2012; Verba et al.,
2003). Study and consent procedures were approved by the university review boards of the researcher and all three community colleges. To be eligible for the study, participants, or someone living in
their household, had to be enrolled in either TANF, SNAP, or WIC
in the past twelve months; have been eligible to vote on November
8, 2012 (the Presidential election immediately preceding data collection); and be a current part-time or full-time student enrolled
in one of the community colleges. Recruitment presentations were
given to introductory level psychology, sociology, and human services classes. Thirty-one total students expressed interest and met
eligibility criteria, and twenty-eight students participated, resulting in a 90% response rate. As a thank-you, participants received a
$15 gift certificate to their choice of a grocery store after completing
the second interview.
Two in-person contacts (pre-interview contact and semi-structured interview) were made with each participant at their community college. During the pre-interview contact, an electronic Voting
History/Demographics survey was administered to collect data on
participant characteristics and allow for a contextual breakdown
of their traits and experiences. It included questions about participants’ past voting history, perceptions of the role of government,
which were taken from a 2014 Pew Research Poll, and general
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demographic information. The second contact was a semi-structured interview. It consisted of six open-ended questions with multiple follow-up questions and probes for each. Additionally, spontaneous probes were used to obtain more in-depth answers and
encourage more natural responses (Padgett, 2008). In some cases,
probes were informed by data collected from the electronic surveys. Often the researcher summarized and clarified participant
statements during the interview. This provided “on-the-spot confirmation or disconfirmation of the interviewer’s interpretations”
(Kvale & Brinkman, 2009, p. 195). All contacts were conducted between October 26, 2015, and February 25, 2016. During this time
frame, national attention was focused on the Republican and Democratic political races leading up to the 2016 presidential primary
elections. These events may have influenced participants’ perceptions about how they make voting decisions, which is the major
limitation of the study. Saturation was achieved in this study, as
distinct themes of voting behaviors emerged, and no new codes or
sub-themes were developed before all interviews were completed
(Padgett, 2008). Each interview was digitally recorded, transcribed
by the researcher, and uploaded into NVivo 10, as were field notes.

Analysis
Because the study’s sample was composed of both participants
who had voted in past elections and those who had never voted,
negative case analysis was used to compare these groups. In this
way, the logic and method of case study analysis was adopted. It
allowed for the discernment of patterns that promote and discourage voting (Eisenhardt, 2002). Data from each case (individual) was
unpacked and examined but viewed as a whole in relation to others in their same voting category of “voter” or “nonvoter” (Padgett,
2008). Data from “voter” and “nonvoter” categories were viewed in
comparison to each other, voting literature, statistics, and theory.
Additionally, constructs developed in the conceptual framework to
operationalize empowerment were developed as provisional codes
(Miles et al., 2014) when transcripts supported their inclusion.
A second coder with a different perspective and knowledge
than the primary investigator-author was used to ensure rigor. After
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co-coding eighteen transcripts, an overall inter-rater reliability score
of 0.8494 was achieved. Additionally, a matrix coding query was used
to confirm the emergence of four different voting themes related to
voter types noticed and developed by the researcher and co-coder.
Lastly, data from the electronic surveys was retrieved from Qualtrics,
and reports of frequencies were used to compute averages. These results were used to triangulate the findings of the analysis.

Results
The demographic characteristics of the twenty-eight participants were diverse and provided a plentiful and robust opportunity to explore “why” and “how” citizens with so much at stake
in elections decide to vote or not. Participants were almost evenly
distributed between the three community colleges. Sixteen participants voted in past elections (54%), and twelve never voted (46%).
All but one participant (96%) received SNAP benefits. The one participant who did not receive SNAP benefits received only WIC benefits. Two participants who received SNAP benefits also received
WIC benefits, and one received TANF and WIC benefits. Notably,
three (11%) participants were veterans of the war in Afghanistan,
two participants shared they had been homeless for several months
in the past two years, and sixteen participants (57%) had a student
loan. Demographics of age, gender, race, and gender will be discussed in relation to the differences in voting behaviors.
Through the grounded theory analysis, themes related to how
voters make decisions about voting emerged. These themes suggest four distinct patterns of how voters make decisions related
to voting. These patterns are discussed in terms of four types of
patterns related to voting behaviors: dedicated voter, voter, nonvoter, and dedicated nonvoter, acknowledging that within them are
individual differences. These themes were not based on quantitative measures of voting frequency, often used in voting literature
to describe voters. Instead, they were based on general patterns
and commonalties of how recipients of means-tested government
assistance described their voting decisions. Voter decision-making
is a complex psychological process influenced by structural political factors. The patterns associated within each voting type should
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not be understood as absolutes but as generalities to guide social
work inventions to encourage voting. Future studies are needed to
confirm the identified themes of these findings and test the validity
of the patterns related to the identified voter types.
Dedicated Voters
Seven participants were identified as dedicated voters. This
group’s average age was thirty-two years old, slightly older than
the overall average age (twenty-eight years old) of the sample. Most
were female (five out of six) and African American (five out of seven), and one was also biracial. No Hispanics were represented in
this group.
Dedicated voters have a strong voter schema, meaning being a
“voter” is part of their identity (Bedolla & Michelson, 2012). Voting
is routine. They vote regardless of whether or not they like the candidates and whether or not an election has a historical significance.
They philosophically believe in democracy and perceive their one
vote is the “capacity” for them to exert control on the political process. They do not blindly trust politicians and are aware of the inefficiency of government and politics, but intellectually trust the
process of democracy. No other voter type demonstrated this unequivocal sense of the importance of voting and social trust. This
supports research that social trust is an important factor in promoting voting (Kelly, 2009; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner & Brown, 2005). Dedicated voters’ confidence in the system contributes to their sense of
having self-efficacy to influence the political system, which is critical for individuals to feel they have the ability to vote and make a
difference (Beaumont, 2011; Condon & Holleque, 2013; Ozymy, 2012;
Verba et al., 1995). They have a sense of responsibility to vote because the democratic process depends on it. “Raven,” a 37-year-old
African American female, explained, “You have to do it. It is a must,
you know. That’s what I was taught when I was growing up.”
Dedicated voters keenly understand the relationship between
electoral politics, policy, social welfare, and their lives. They understand that their government assistance is tied to electoral politics.
“Melanie,” a 46-year-old, non-Hispanic/white female voiced this
belief: “Whoever we have in office, whichever office we are dealing with has to do with my livelihood. My children’s livelihood.
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My family’s livelihood. Everybody around us.” Being a recipient of
means-tested government assistance did not discourage dedicated
voters from voting, as the literature suggests of welfare recipients
(Edin & Schaeffer, 2015; Soss & Schram, 2007; Swartz et al., 2009). Instead, being dependent on government assistance motivated them
to vote to put a leader in office who will reform policy in a way that
benefits their lives.
Dedicated voters overcame challenges to voting by planning
ahead and not getting discouraged by obstacles. They scheduled
their day around voting, and several mentioned using free transportation offered by campaigns to get to the polls, regardless if they
supported the candidate. They found ways to overcome barriers to
voting because of the importance of elections. Dedicated voters perceived the “benefits” of voting outweighed the “costs” of having to
overcome the barriers to voting, which is associated with increased
voting (Driscoll & Krook, 2012; Edlin et al., 2007). They possess
the socio-psychological characteristics associated with informed
voting and demonstrate behaviors consistent with intrapersonal,
interpersonal, and political empowerment.
Voters
Over one-third of the sample (nine participants) was identified
as voters. The average age of this voter type was twenty-eight, the
same as the sample. Five were female, and four were male. Additionally, characteristics of race and ethnicity were more evenly
distributed: four non-Hispanic/white, three Hispanic and/or Puerto
Rican, and two Black.
Voters do not vote with the same intensity, thoughtfulness, or
intention as the dedicated voter. The “voter” type is not defined
by the frequency of one’s voting as some participants always vote,
and others vote sometimes. What connects them is their shared
perceptions about the meaning and significance of voting and similar patterns in making voting decisions. They lacked the strong
social trust, sense of efficacy, and conviction about the importance
of voting, which is linked to intrapersonal empowerment and
demonstrated by dedicated voters.
Voters had a continuum of perspectives, beliefs, and levels of
understanding about how, if at all, electoral politics affected them.
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Some had a general understanding of the relationship between
electoral politics and policy but lacked a clear understanding of
how this might impact their lives or their government assistance.
For example, “Jasmine” a 28-year-old African American female,
stated, “They just gave me a sticker, and I felt important like I did
something that mattered to most people around me. But I really
didn’t see how it would affect me at the time or how it would help
me.” This is interesting because a lack of political knowledge or interest and apathy about politics are factors known to impede voting
(Blais & St. Vincent, 2011; Piven & Cloward, 2000). Yet, in five of the
nine voters, lack of political interest did not impede voting; it instead impeded their informed voting. This suggests that this group
of voters lacked insights related to interpersonal empowerment.
In contrast to dedicated voters, voters could be dissuaded from
voting because they did not like candidates’ character traits. Additionally, voters were less willing than dedicated voters to overcome
hurdles associated with voting. “Winter,” a 26-year-old white female
summed it up, “So if I have time that day, then I go, and I vote. But
it’s usually like a hassle”. Other participants discussed the difficulty
of getting transportation to vote, the inconvenience of dragging their
small children to the polls, and having to take time off from work as
reasons they decided not to vote. This outlook is consistent with the
literature that means-tested recipients are less likely to vote for practical reasons (Edin & Schaeffer, 2015; Soss & Schram, 2007), making
the fortitude of the dedicated voter type so remarkable.
Nonvoters
Seven participants were identified as nonvoters. The demographics of voters and nonvoters are similar. Their average age was twenty-five, three years younger than the average age of the sample. The
majority (five) of these participants were female. Also, one participant
identified as male and one as transgender. Four participants identified as being Hispanic or Puerto Rican, and three as non-Hispanic/
white. Four of the seven nonvoters were registered to vote.
For the most part, nonvoters do not think about voting. They
are apathetic and disinterested in the political process. As “Joy,” a
28-years-old Hispanic/white female, summarized, “I don’t care. Since
it’s not an interest, I’m not really seeking information or questioning.”
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Apathy defines this voter type. This is consistent with literature and
public opinion polls linking apathy as the primary internal barrier to
voting (Page, 2012; Piven & Cloward, 2000). Additionally, it suggests
that these nonvoters lack traits related to political empowerment.
Nonvoters lack understanding of the nature of social-political issues
and the connection between politics and government assistance.
When asked about the relationship between food stamps, politics,
and voting, “Franklin,” a 25-year-old Hispanic/Bi-racial male, replied, “I do not see the connection.” Nonvoters seem to lack a critical
understanding of how political structures influence their lives and
thus lack interpersonal empowerment, which limits their motivation
to vote and overcome barriers to voting.
Dedicated Nonvoter
Five participants were identified as dedicated nonvoters. Three
were female, and two were male. Their average age was twenty-five
years old. Three were non-Hispanic/white, one was Hispanic/Black,
and one is Black.
Dedicated nonvoters are especially unique. They share traits of
both dedicated voters and nonvoters. Similar to dedicated voters,
dedicated nonvoters understand the relationship between electoral
politics, policy, and their lives. Dedicated nonvoters, like nonvoters,
think voting is not important, but this belief does not stem from
apathy related to not caring. Rather, it is the product of alienation
related to not believing democracy is possible, believing that politicians do what they want, are controlled by political donors, and
do not care about people like them. “Daryl,” a 23-year-old African
American male, discussed how elected officials are “puppets.”
“Obama was the only one I was interested in because I could relate…I felt like even with him [President Obama]…He is a puppet.
He is not running the show anyway. We all know Presidents do not
run the show.”
Dedicated nonvoters lack any sense of social trust, hope, or
self-efficacy. They believe their voices do not matter and lack any
sense of intrapersonal empowerment. They feel overwhelming
powerlessness fueled by being a recipient of means-tested government assistance. “Alexus,” a 22-year-old Hispanic/Black female, discussed how politicians do not care or understand people like her.
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Because it [enough benefits] would show me that the politicians
or the governor or the mayor care about needs that me and people
that are similar to me go through…It’s just they don’t care about a
lot of needs that people like myself are going through.

The inadequate response by government officials to address public needs stemming from social and economic inequality reinforces
their belief that politicians do not care and voting does not matter.
This is the cycle that discourages lower-income citizens from voting
(Hacker et al., 2007; Leighley & Nagler, 2014). Dedicated nonvoters
are resigned that nothing can or will be done to change the system.
Alienation is known to impede voting and political participation
(Adams et al., 2006). Additionally, unlike voters and nonvoters, they
are keenly aware of how politics impact their lives and possess a
strong sense of interpersonal empowerment. Yet, in voting literature, alienation/resignation and critical awareness of one’s social
position and the nature of social-political issues are not associated
with one another. Critical awareness is widely thought to lead to action to influence systematic change and thought (Freire, 2000). This
anomaly makes the identification of the dedicated nonvoter significant. More nuanced question wording is needed in all research
that distinguishes dedicated nonvoters and nonvoters’ motivations
not to vote.

Discussion
These findings provide insight into voting literature, the profession of social work, and ways to increase voter turnout of marginalized citizens. To address low voter turnout, indirect interventions
are needed to encourage “the party of nonvoters” (Pew Research
Center, 2014) to understand the political process, think more critically about the importance of voting, and consider voting decisions
in strategic ways. The four voting behaviors patterns provide a way
to better understand voters and nonvoters and suggest appropriate voting interventions to increase voting participation amongst
those with different understandings about the importance of voting. Social work needs to meet each voter where they are in terms
of how they perceive voting and how they understand their positionality as means-tested government assistance recipients. In the
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past, social work has approached voter engagement in a generic,
cookie-cutter method. It was assumed that registering voters and
providing them information about voting and rides to the polls
would lead to greater voter participation. An array of interventions
are needed to encourage informed voting by all voters.
Dedicated voters need to be encouraged in their voting practices
and tapped to work within social service agencies to support ongoing efforts to create a culture of voting. Their voices are powerful.
On the other hand, voters need opportunities to gain critical awareness and understanding that voting is important to influence policy
decisions, not just cast a ballot for a candidate. It is essential that voters make informed decisions about whether or not to cast a ballot
(Sandler et al.,). Social workers can provide data that demonstrates
how high voter turnout of marginalized groups has the potential to
lead to greater political power, protection of a group’s interest, and
increased access to public services. This information can encourage
informed voting decisions and provide foundational reasoning for
how the potential benefits of voting outweigh the costs related to
inconvenience. Lastly, social workers in social service agencies can
develop creative ways to mitigate factors that make voting inconvenient for voters and encourage voting. For example, by extending
hours at community child care centers, organizing transportation
to the polls, and providing resources for clients to locate their polling place, along with having access to mail-in ballots, voters will
be more likely to cast ballots. Likewise, social workers focused on
policy practice and political social work can lobby for the voting
process to be more convenient.
It is hard to motivate a nonvoter to vote when they fundamentally have not thought about voting and do not care about voting.
Nonvoters exemplify being apathetic to voting in the way Piven and
Cloward (2000) understood the role of apathy. This apathy is related
to a lack of interest in politics, policy, and a lack of a sense of being
a voter. Social workers in social service agencies and educational
settings can promote voting just by discussing voting in non-partisan ways, which for the nonvoter might encourage their awareness
and interest in voting. Once nonvoters have at least thought about
voting, they may be better able to hear messages that encourage
voters to vote. Otherwise, they might continue to block out this information because they believe it does not apply to them.
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One of the most important findings of this study is the emergence of the dedicated nonvoter theme. Past literature and conventional thinking by political elites have assumed that nonvoters are
satisfied with the status quo and are generally apathetic (Piven
& Cloward, 2000). These findings suggest otherwise. Dedicated
nonvoters decide not to vote because, based on their positionality,
they believe that their voting is useless. Dedicated nonvoters are
unsatisfied to the point of being alienated and resigned, which has
led to their decision not to vote. This decision is understandable. To
increase the likelihood of dedicated voters deciding to cast a ballot, social workers should focus on dismantling the sources of their
alienation. Dedicated nonvoters need opportunities to connect with
elected officials and provide an outlet for their voices to be heard.
Interventions such as town-hall-style forums and meetings with
elected leaders to address their needs would begin to break down
their deep sense of alienation.

Conclusion
Social work interventions are needed to encourage recipients of
means-tested assistance to gain an understanding of the political
process, think more critically about the importance of voting, acquire
a sense of group identity with other recipients of means-tested government assistance, and consider voting decisions in strategic ways.
Voting blocs have the power to impact policy (Piven & Cloward,
2000). Social efforts to increase voter engagement are consistent with
social work values and are vital to promoting social justice (Abramovitz et al., 2019). Social workers who interact directly with recipients
of means-tested assistance in social service agencies and other community settings are in a position to encourage voter engagement.
Through greater voter participation, recipients of means-tested assistance can increase leverage to gain greater government resource access. Community agencies need to be organized to develop their clients’ critical understanding to cast informed votes. Social work must
prioritize making the connection between the personal and the political visible to the groups we are called to serve. In addition to voter
registration drives and get-out-the-vote efforts, social workers can
provide non-partisan information about the voting process and explain and distribute information about the different responsibilities
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of local, state, and the federal government. Macro social workers
need to continue efforts to make the voting process more accessible and take policy stances that address structural inequalities that
fuel alienation. Now is the time for the profession of social work to
unite in efforts that can increase the voting power of marginalized
populations so that all voices are heard and the needs of all people
are addressed in public policy.
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Are Non-Religious College Students
the New Anti-Racists on the Block?
An Exploration of the Effects of
Non-Religiosity on College Students’
White Racial Identities
Paula K. Miller

Department of Sociology
and Anthropology
Ohio University
The purpose of this study was to explore the effects of non-religiosity on
white college students’ racial identities. Previous research on this topic is
minimal and has focused on the impact of non-religiosity on attitudinal
components of white racial identity. We expand this work using the White
Racial Identity Scale, which measures white racial identity through a variety of attitudes, behaviors, and cultural preferences. We found that non-religious white students were more likely than religious white students to
report racially progressive attitudes, behaviors, and cultural preferences,
including less investment in American and ethnic practices, less trust in
mainstream American institutions, and more openness to cross-racial contact. However, non-religiosity is not a perfectly linear pathway to more
cosmopolitan white racial identities, as religious and non-religious white
students reported similar levels of intimate cross-racial relationships and
racially homogeneous musical preferences. Our work reveals areas of development for non-religious and religious white college students that could
lead to more racial egalitarianism on college campuses.
Keywords: college students, racial identity, racism, religiosity, white racial
identity scale
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Religiosity is often associated with the positive impact it has on
identity. Religion provides an institutionalized framework for morality, holding adherents to culturally sanctioned ideologies about right
and wrong and encouraging adherents to develop valuable feelings,
such as compassion and kindness (Batson et al., 2001). Religion is
also integral to the development of social identities, as it can be a
key contributing factor to the social cohesion of in-group members
(Durkheim, 2012), by increasing individuals’ sense of belonging and
connection to other members of their cultural group. Alternately,
non-religiosity is often associated with aberrant forms of morality
and cultural exclusion (Campbell, 1971; Edgell et al., 2006). In contrast to these mainstream understandings of the effects of religiosity
and non-religiosity, research has found that individuals who identify
as non-religious are consistently more social justice oriented, more
communal, and less prejudiced (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Zuckerman, 2009) than individuals with strong religious identifications.
This is especially true for white Americans (Sanchez & Carter, 2005).
In particular, research has shown that white Americans who identify
as Christian are more likely to exhibit racial prejudice, stronger ingroup racial boundaries, and increased preferences for racially segregated spaces (Bracey & Moore, 2017).
Despite the breadth of research that has indicated that religiosity is likely a key predictor of how whites perceive and interact
with people of color (e.g., white racism), previous research that examines the role of religiosity on whites’ own racial identities and
self-concept has been minimal. Research that has explored the
relationship between religiosity and white racial identity (Sciarra
& Gushue, 2003) has relied on measures of white racial identity
that primarily conceptualize of white racial identities in terms of
white racial attitudes that develop exclusively through a process of
contact with people of color. In our research, we expand existing
studies through the use of a social-psychological framework that
conceptualizes white racial identity as a latent construct that includes whites’ attitudes, behaviors, and cultural preferences. Racial
identity has been conceptualized in a similar fashion for people of
color (Klonoff & Landrine, 2000), but research exploring the behavioral and cultural patterns that comprise white racial identity has
been limited. We explore the relationship between non-religiosity
and white racial identity in a sample of 220 white college students.
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We were interested in the relationship between non-religiosity and
white racial identity in the white college population in particular,
as research has shown that college campuses are important spaces for racial identity development. In addition, recent reports have
demonstrated that college-aged adults report racial identities that
are generally more racially egalitarian (Pew Research Center, 2019b)
and more open to cross-racial contact (Pew Research Center, 2019a)
than individuals in older cohorts. However, most college campuses
remain predominately white, both in their demographic makeup
and in the institutional practices that guide them (Bonilla-Silva,
2015). Therefore, we were interested in exploring whether religiosity may serve as a mechanism to explain these opposing patterns on
college campuses.

Non-Religiosity
Non-religiosity is most often defined by what it is not. Nonreligious identification, at its most fundamental level, signifies a
category that is lacking religion, or that exists in opposition or indifference to traditional religious beliefs (Vernon, 1968). Non-religious
belief systems do not incorporate convictions about ultimate beings
that dictate moral behavior and dole out rewards and punishments
based on how well adherents ascribe to said behavior. However,
recent research has argued that non-religiosity cannot simply be
defined by what it lacks (Lee, 2015). Instead, this research has found
that non-religious adherents comprise a unique cultural group,
through which particular types of norms and worldviews are created, maintained, and contested1 (Campbell, 1971). Similar to other
cultural groups, non-religious group membership guides adherents
cultural, emotional, political, and social attachments (Lee, 2015) in a
variety of ways.
Non-religious membership has increased in recent decades.
Almost a quarter of American adults identified as non-religious
in 20142 (Pew Research Center, 2014), making non-religiosity the
second largest religious identification, after Christianity, in the
United States. Non-religiosity is especially popular in traditional
college-aged populations, as evidenced by the fact that over a third
of those who identify as non-religious are 18–29, and almost twothirds of those who identify as non-religious report having at least
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some college (Pew Research Center, 2014). Despite the growth of
individuals who identify as non-religious, the non-religious remain
a marginalized group. Non-religious adherents are perceived as
being less moral, less trustworthy, and more dangerous than their
religious counterparts (Zuckerman, 2009). On college campuses,
these beliefs translate to increased levels of stigma and discrimination toward non-religious college students (Harper, 2007) that
often result in feelings of isolation and self-segregation (Goodman
& Mueller, 2009).

Racial Identity
Identities are representations of who people perceive themselves to be, how others perceive them, and where individuals are
situated in the larger social structure (Burke, 2004). Racial identities
are a particular type of social identity that develop in relation to
their contact with the attitudes, orientations, and values of other
racialized individuals (Helms & Carter, 1990) and the racialized
social system more broadly (Bonilla-Silva, 2006) These racialized
identities often serve to unite group members, and encourage group
members to develop attitudes, behaviors, and cultural preferences
that are congruent with the interests of their own racial group, often at the expense of members of other racial groups (Tajfel, 1982).
White racial identities develop on a different trajectory than other
racialized identities. Whites occupy a uniquely privileged position
in American society, which allows them to deny the relevance of
their racial identity if they so choose (Frankenberg, 1993). In addition, this privileged social position often leads to the development of a racialized identity that is used as the hegemonic standard
against which other identities are held (Hughey, 2010). For many
whites, college campuses serve as institutional spaces that heighten
the salience and visibility of their racial identity, through increased
contact with people of color and curriculum that may include an
exploration of race (Mercer & Cunningham, 2003).
Historically, white racial identity has most often been explored
through constructs that ask participants whether they identify as
white and whether they felt that their fate was tied in to the fate
of other whites (Bobo & Johnson, 2000). The White Racial Identity
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Attitude Scale is the most well-known construct of white racial
identity (Helms & Carter, 1990) and envisions white racial identity
as a developmental process, wherein whites move from the “contact” stage, wherein they ascribe to numerous racist beliefs and
are largely unaware of their status as racial beings to an “autonomy” stage, wherein they ascribe to views that are non-racist and
become more aware of their own racial identity. Although useful
to our understanding of whites’ self-concept, this scale provides
more information about whites’ acceptance of racialized ethnic
others than it does about the ideologies and practices that constitute whites own identities (Rowe, 2006). More recent research has
theorized that white racial identities comprise a number of components. Of these, whites’ racial attitudes (Bobo & Johnson, 2000;
Sears et al., 2000) and levels of cross-racial contact (Helms & Carter,
1990; Krysan et al., 2008) have been the most studied. Recent research has also theorized that whites who report more investment
in nationalistic American ideologies, such as American pride and
anti-immigrant sentiment, may have stronger white racial identities than whites who are less nationalistic (McDermott & Samson,
2005). Less research has examined the cultural components that
comprise white racial identity (McDermott & Samson, 2005; Perry,
2002). These studies have theorized that participation in ethnic rituals, including holidays, may be key predictors of white racial identity (Perry, 2002). Trust in mainstream American institutions has
also been theorized to correlate with white racial identity (LaVeist
et al., 2000; Tyler, 2005). This is not surprising, given the Eurocentric
values that infuse American institutions, and the fact that many
of these institutions have historically been used as vehicles to discriminate against people of color. Although there is a breadth of
work demonstrating that musical and food-based preferences that
infuse the racial identities of people of color (Klonoff & Landrine,
2000), little work has been done to explore the relationship between
these preferences and white racial identity.
Religiosity and Racial Identity
Much of the previous research on religion and racial identity
has found that individuals who identify as religious are more likely
to exhibit racial identities that display strong levels of prejudice.
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One of the first studies on this relationship (Allport & Kramer, 1946)
found that Christians tended to exhibit more racial prejudice than
non-religious individuals. Since Allport and Kramer’s (1964) study,
numerous studies have explored this relationship, confirming that
individuals who identify as religious, regardless of the particular
religious group to which they ascribe, are often more likely to be
prejudiced (Batson et al., 1993; Brown, 2019; Jones, 2020a, 2020b;
Whitehead & Perry, 2020). However, this relationship does not
always hold true across racial lines. For example, religious Black
Americans are less likely to report prejudice than non-religious
Black Americans (Sanchez & Carter, 2005). Alternately, research has
demonstrated that individuals from a variety of racial backgrounds
who identify as non-religious are more likely to be social justice
oriented, less nationalistic, and less prejudiced (Zuckerman, 2009)
than religious individuals. In particular, this research has found
that whites who identify as non-religious are more likely to participate in social movements that call for racial egalitarianism, such
as the Civil Rights movement and current movements in support
of immigrant rights, in comparison with religious whites (Zuckerman, 2009).
Despite the breadth of research about the relationship between
religiosity and particular components of racial identity, such as
prejudice, little research has been done to explore the relationship
between religiosity and racial identity more broadly. This is especially true for research on the relationship between religiosity and
white racial identity, which has been sparse and has explored white
racial identity exclusively through an analysis of white racial attitudes that develop in contact with other people of color. In particular, this research has found that as whites progressively move
towards what Helm’s (1990) has labeled autonomy, wherein they
are more comfortable with their own racial identity, more likely
to construct positive associations with that identity, and less likely to rely on negative stereotypes about people of color, they are
also more likely to develop flexible religious orientations, such as
non-religiosity (Sciarra & Gushue, 2003). In light of mainstream
American religious philosophies, this suggests that individuals
who identify as non-religious may also demonstrate more progressive white racial identities. Although helpful in our understanding
of how non-religiosity influences the extent to which whites interact

Non-Religiosity and White Racial Identity

103

with people of color and whether whites perceive themselves as racialized beings, additional research is needed to understand how
non-religiosity impacts other components of white racial identity.

Methods
Participants
The sample for this research is comprised of a convenience
sample of 220 white college students at a selective public research
university in the midwestern region of the United States. A sample
size of 220 was selected to ensure that our sample exceeded sample size requirements for relative bias of less than 10% (Austin &
Steyerberg, 2015) and rule of thumb estimates that sample sizes include at least 30 participants per independent variable (Cohen et
al., 2003; Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 2013). Participants were recruited
through their enrollment in a variety of social science courses. Participants completed the survey in person and were asked to read
and sign a consent form before completing the survey. In addition,
participants reported their racial-ethnic identification through the
use of an open-ended question that has been validated in previous
research (Phinney, 1992; Phinney & Ong, 2007), that asked participants “What is your racial-ethnic group?” Only participants who
consented to the survey and identified as being white, Caucasian, or
of European descent were included in our final sample. Participants
were required to complete the survey in one sitting and were asked
to complete the survey in its entirety. Undergraduate students were
intentionally selected for our sample as college is a crucial stage for
identity development (Arnett, 2011). Yet, most research on religion
and different components of white racial identity has explored these
relationships in the broader population, finding that more religious
populations in general and Christian populations in particular are
more likely to exhibit attitudes, behaviors, and cultural preferences
that are more strongly aligned with racism, and elicit less contact
with people of color. We were interested in exploring whether these
relationships held true in a college sample, given recent reports that
college students tend to develop progressive and racially egalitarian attitudes and identities (Pew Research Center, 2019a, 2019b). Our
sample consisted of slightly more female than male participants,
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reflecting averages for the university included in this study as well
as averages for college attendees nationwide (U.S Department of
Education National Center for Education Statistics, 2019). Almost
half of our sample reported household incomes of $80,000 or above,
echoing university demographics of household incomes that are
slightly higher than other selective public universities (The New
York Times, 2017). Finally, over two-thirds of our sample identified
as suburban, which parallels data from the university in this study
as well as national trends that have found that suburban students
make up the bulk of college enrollments (National Student Clearinghouse Research Center, 2019). Additional information about the
socio-demographic frequencies of our sample can be found in Table
1. In addition to baseline socio-demographic information, this table
includes frequencies that provide insight into participants’ early racial socialization, which we use as controls in our subsequent analyses, given research demonstrating that racial socialization is a key
contributor to racial identity.

Measures
White Racial Identity
White racial identity was measured using the White Racial Identity Scale (WRIS). The WRIS (Miller, 2017) consists of 24 Likert-type
items that each included five response options meant to communicate frequency or agreement. These items measure eight components of white racial identity, including whites’ American, Cross-Racial, Ethnic, Intimate, Racial, Institutional, Music and Food attitudes,
behaviors and cultural preferences that have been validated in previous research (Miller, 2017). American measured whites’ American
attitudes, behavior and cultural preferences through six Likert-type
items that asked participants to record responses communicating
how they would categorize their political beliefs, their opinions
about the importance of American pride, the frequency of their participation in American holidays and festivals, their opinions about
whether or not English should be the official language of the United States, and their feelings of belonging to their own racial-ethnic
group. Higher scores indicate a stronger ethno-American identity,
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Table 1: Demographic Information (n=220)
Gender

Male
Female

40.5%
59.5%

Less than $19,999
$20,000-$39,000
$40,000-$59,000
$60,000-$79,000
$80,000 and above

1.4%
7.7%
22.7%
21.4%
46.8%

Rural
Suburban
Urban

21.8%
70.5%
7.7%

Religion

Non-Religious
Christian
Catholic
Jewish

17.7%
38.3%
37.3
6.7%

Racial Composition of
School, Neighborhood
and Family Networks
While Growing Up

All White
Mostly White
Racially Mixed
Mostly Black
All Black

9.5%
57.7%
31.4%
1.4%
0%

Racial Composition of
Current Neighborhood

All White
Mostly White
Racially Mixed
Mostly Black
All Black

10.5%
45.5%
42.3%
1.4%
.5%

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither
Agree
Strongly Agree

11.8%
30.5%
9.1%
39.5%
9.1%

Household Income

Urbanicity

Some Members of my
Immediate Family
are Prejudiced

Notes: Frequencies rounded to nearest tenth, and therefore, the sum of all frequencies may
equal slightly more or less than 100%.
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and increased likelihood for political conservativism. Cross-Racial
measured whites’ attitudes regarding cross-racial interactions
through five Likert-type items that measured whites’ feelings of
comfort and admiration for their own racial group and their attitudes about racial and ethnic out-group interaction. Higher scores
indicate weaker preferences for out-group interaction and stronger
preferences for in-group interaction with other white Americans.
Ethnic measured whites’ ethnic attitudes, behaviors and preferences through three items that included their participation in and research on the traditions of their own ethnic group. Higher scores
indicate a stronger ethnic identity, and more frequent participation
in practices that are affiliated with their own ethnic group. Intimate
measured the frequency with which whites formed close relationships with friends and romantic partners that are white as opposed
to people of color. Higher scores indicate more frequent intimate
relationships with others that also identify as white. Racial consisted of two items that measured whites’ racial attitudes, through
two questions that asked whites whether they think discrimination
plays a role in Black employment and lack of success. Higher scores
indicate beliefs that Blacks are to blame for their own plight, while
ignoring the role of racism and structural discrimination in racebased inequalities. Institutional measured whites’ institutional attitudes through two items that measured the degree to which whites
in our sample trust doctors and the government. Higher scores
indicate higher levels of trust in key American institutions. Music
measured whites’ musical attitudes, behaviors, and cultural preferences through two items that asked participants the extent to which
they prefer Black music to white music and how often they listen to
Black music in comparison to white music. Higher scores indicate
music-based practices and preferences that are more closely aligned
with white music artists. Food measured whites’ behaviors towards
food and consisted of two items that included how often whites ate
casseroles and participated in potlucks. Higher scores indicate food
preferences that have been hypothesized in previous research to be
closely associated with white cultural practices (Perry, 2002) and/or
were in contrast with food preferences previously demonstrated to
be central to Black racial identity (Klonoff & Landrine, 2000).
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Religious Identification
Participants’ religious identification was measured through an
open-ended question that asked participants to identify their religious background. Responses were recoded into a binary response
variable, with participants who recorded any religious affiliation
being coded as religious, and participants identifying as secular or
agnostic being coded as non-religious. Although recent research has
shown that non-religious theists, or those who identify as “spiritual
but non-religious” comprise a significant segment of the non-religious population (Baker, 2021), no participants in our research identified as such, and therefore, this affiliation is not included in our
analysis. Previous research has demonstrated the validity of grouping secular and agnostic participants into a non-religious category
given that both groups are united in their opposition to formal religion, and their emphasis on religious non-conformity (Cragun et al.,
2012). This variable allowed us to explore whether non-religious participants demonstrated different white racial identities than religious
participants, regardless of their particular religious affiliation.
Socio-Demographic Predictors
We also included a number of socio-demographic predictors in
our analysis that have been shown to be important correlates of racial identity in previous research, including gender (Frankenberg,
1993), income (Hartigan, 2003), urbanicity (Hartigan, 2003; Morris,
2006), the racial composition of the participants previous and current community, and whether participants were socialized around
whites who exhibited prejudicial behaviors (Klonoff & Landrine,
2000). Gender was assessed using a multiple response option that
allowed participants to select male, female, or other. No participants selected the other option. Household income was assessed
using multiple response options that included “less than $19,999,”
“$20,000–$39,999,” “$40,000–$59,999,” “$60,000–$79,999” and “80,000
or above.” Responses were collapsed into a binary response with 1
indicating that participants had household incomes of $80,000 or
above, given the large number of participants recording responses in that category. Urbanicity was assessed using a question that
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asked participants to select whether they grew up in a rural, suburban, or urban area. The racial composition of the networks’
participants were embedded in prior to attending college was
measured through the prompt “Growing up, my school, neighborhood, and family was.” Participants were instructed to select from
a range of five Likert-type responses including “all white,” “mostly
white,” “racially mixed,” “mostly Black” and “all Black” (Klonoff &
Landrine, 2000). Responses were recoded into “all white,” “mostly white,” and “racially mixed and mostly Black.” No participants
identified as having grown up in all-Black networks, or in networks
that were predominately comprised of members of racial-ethnic
groups other than white or Black. Current neighborhood composition was measured through the prompt “I currently live in a
neighborhood that is.” Participants were instructed to select from
a range of five Likert-type responses including “all white,” “mostly
white,” “racially mixed,” “mostly Black” and “all Black” (Klonoff &
Landrine, 2000). Responses were recoded into “all white,” “mostly
white,” and “racially mixed, mostly Black, and all Black.” No respondents reported that they currently lived in a neighborhood
that was comprised of members of racial-ethnic groups other than
white or Black. Higher levels of response on both variables indicate
that participants were more likely to be immersed in environments
that included people of color. Family prejudice was measured by
asking participants to indicate their level of agreement with the
statement “some members of my immediate family are prejudiced”
(Klonoff & Landrine, 2000). Participants were instructed to select
from a five category Likert-type response that ranged from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Higher levels of response indicated
higher levels of family prejudice. Political ideology was not included as a socio-demographic predictor in our models, as it is included
in our measure of white racial identity.

Missing Data
An analysis of missing data was performed on all variables.
There were no significant relationships found between any of the
missing responses in our dataset and all variables were missing less
than 10% of responses, indicating that there were no patterns to our
missing data that would impact interpretation of our results (Dong
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& Peng, 2013). Therefore, to ensure the most robust dataset, we imputed missing data using the medians for each variable (Cokluk &
Kayri, 2011).

Analytic Strategy
We use multiple linear regression to examine whether non-religiosity is associated with eight components that comprise participants’ white racial identity. Multiple linear regression was selected, as each included component of white racial identity consists of
Likert-type items with five or more response options, and therefore, were treated as continuous (Bollen & Barb, 1981). In addition,
multiple linear regression is commonly used on convenience samples in the social sciences, even though these samples do not fully
meet parametric test requirements for randomness (Zhao, 2020).
Although such analysis may not be fully generalizable to the population as a whole, it can still provide valuable insights into relationships that exist in the broader population (Cohen et al., 2003).
All analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS version 24 and the p
value was set at <0.05.

Results
Mean scores were calculated for each of the eight components
previously demonstrated to be key components of white racial identity by dividing the sum of all of the score values for each item by
the number of items in the scale (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). In addition,
internal reliabilities for each scale were calculated. Mean scores and
internal reliability statistics for each scale can be found in Table 2.
Although some of these alpha reliabilities did not meet the suggested statistical strength of .7 (DeVellis, 2012), they were retained due
to the fact that the low alpha reliabilities were likely the result of
the exploratory nature of the original WRIS and consequently, the
limited number of items that loaded on each factor (Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1994).
Table 3 demonstrates the relationship between religious identity and eight components of white racial identity, while controlling
for a number of socio-demographic predictors that have previously
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Table 2: Alpha Values for Each White Racial Identity
Component (N=220)
Component

Mean

SD

Alpha

Common
Variance

Measurement
Error

American
Cross-Racial
Ethnic
Intimate
Racial
Institutional
Music
Food

3.44
3.54
2.72
3.88
2.48
3.32
3.32
2.37

.694
.577
.870
.768
.850
.777
.588
.848

.744
.691
.754
.668
.769
.682
.625
.580

55%
48%
57%
45%
59%
47%
39%
34%

45%
52%
43%
55%
41%
53%
61%
66%

been shown to be associated with white racial identity. These
models explain up to 17% of the adjusted variance in each of the
corresponding components. Non-religious white students reported lower scores on five of the eight components used to measure
white racial identity in comparison with religious white students.
In particular, non-religious students reported lower scores on the
Ethnic component of white racial identity (p≤0.05) in comparison
to students of all reported religious identifications (i.e., Christian,
Catholic, and Jewish), indicating that ethnic identities and practices were less salient for non-religious students than religious students. Non-religious students also reported lower scores on the
American (p≤0.001), Cross-Racial (p≤0.01), and Institutional (p≤0.05)
components of white racial identity, in comparison with Christian
and Catholic students, indicating that non-religious students were
less likely to subscribe to traditional American values, to prefer interacting in white spaces vs. more racially integrated ones, and to
support American institutions, in comparison to religious students.
The non-religious students in our study reported lower scores on
the Racial (p≤0.01) component of white racial identity, in comparison to Catholic students, indicating that non-religious students
are less likely to support individual vs. structural explanations of
racism, in comparison with religious students. Alternately, non-religious students reported higher scores on one of the components
of white racial identity, in comparison to religious students. In
particular, non-religious students reported higher scores on the
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Food component of white racial identity in comparison with Jewish students (p≤0.05), indicating that non-religious students were
more likely to subscribe to white food practices and preferences, in
comparison with Jewish students. Finally, non-religious college students did not report any statistically significant differences on the
Intimate or Music components of white racial identity in comparison
to religious students, indicating that the non-religious and religious
students in our study were equally likely to be involved in intimate relationships with other whites and to enjoy music typically
associated with white culture. Our socio-demographic controls had
varying impacts on students’ white racial identities. Students who
were male, rural, socialized in racially mixed networks, residing
in all-white neighborhoods, or who reported high levels of familial
prejudice were more likely to report higher scores on at least one
component of white racial identity in comparison to students who
were female, suburban, rural, socialized in all-white networks, residing in racially mixed neighborhoods, or who reported low levels
of familial prejudice, indicating that the former group of students
are likely to have more salient white racial identities than the latter.

Discussion
The purpose of our study was to explore the role of religiosity
on eight components previously demonstrated to comprise white
racial identity (Miller, 2017). We found that non-religious white
college students differed in comparison to religious white college
students on six of the eight components, including American, Ethnic,
Cross-Racial, Racial, Institutional and Food. However, non-religious
white college students reported similar scores on the Intimate and
Music components of white racial identity in comparison with
religious white college students. These relationships held true even
when controlling for key socio-demographic predictors, including
income, gender, urbanicity, the racial composition of networks in
which the participants were surrounded, and family prejudice. An
explanation of the relationships between white college students’ religiosity and each of these components is discussed below.
The non-religious white college students in our sample reported lower scores on the American component of white racial identity in comparison with the white college students in our sample

114

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

that self-identified as Catholic or Christian, suggesting that non-religious students were less invested in traditional American practices and less agreeable to nationalistic and/or anti-immigrant
American beliefs in comparison to many of their religious peers.
These findings support existing research that has found that religious individuals in general and white Christians in particular
tend to be more nationalistic than those who do not identify as religious (Perry & Whitehead, 2015; Whitehead & Perry, 2020). In addition, our findings support research that has found associations
between religiosity and anti-immigrant sentiment (Gorski, 2019).
Many of these patterns can be attributed to Christian nationalism
(Perry & Whitehead, 2015), wherein individuals perceive of their
Christian and American identities as interchangeable largely due
to historical processes that imbued American values and practices
with Christian ones (Braunstein, 2018). The relationship between
religiosity is especially true for white Americans, as mainstream
American values often reflect dominant white norms and serve to
justify whites’ privileged social position. Such connections foster
pro-American sentiment, often at the expense of individuals perceived to be “other,” including individuals who identify as people
of color, non-religious, or non-American.
In addition, non-religious white college students reported lower scores on the Cross-Racial component of white racial identity in
comparison with white college students that self-identified as Catholic or Christian, indicating that non-religious white college students were more likely to express support for racially or ethnically
diverse spaces, and less likely to report strong feelings of in-group
attachment to other whites in comparison to their more religious
counterparts. Our findings support previous research that has
shown that religious individuals are less likely to be supportive of
interracial relationships of various forms (Hall et al., 2010; Perry &
Whitehead, 2015). Much of this relationship can be explained by the
racially segregated nature of religious spaces (Emerson & Smith,
2000). Christian churches in particular are designated as white institutional spaces (Moore, 2008), wherein white norms and values
are held up as the ideal, often at the expense of the inclusion of
people of color (Bracey & Moore, 2017). Over half of religious congregations are spaces of absolute segregation, and only 12% of religious congregations have any substantial level of racial diversity
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(Dougherty & Huyser, 2008). The racial segregation of these spaces
infuses the values held by religious populations, and their likelihood to feel comfortable interacting with individuals from other
ethnic and racial groups, as cross-racial contact is a key factor in
decreasing personal prejudice and developing more racially egalitarian attitudes (Helms & Carter, 1990).
Non-religious white college students in our sample also reported lower scores on the Ethnic component of white racial identity in
comparison with all of the white college students that self-identified
with any religious identification (i.e., Catholic, Christian, or Jewish), indicating that non-religious white students were less likely to
participate in the practices of their cultural in-group, such as festivals and the researching of their own “ethnic” history in comparison with their religious peers. There is little research exploring the
connections between religion and ethnic practices within the context of white racial identity. However, there are strong theoretical
traditions that provide some explanation about why non-religious
individuals may be less likely to participate in and value in-group
cultural practices. Non-religious adherents experience high levels of discrimination and stigma (Cragun et al., 2012; Edgell et al.,
2006), even within their ethnic group. Therefore, the non-religious
may be more open to exploring interactions and behaviors that do
not fall within the traditional purview of their own ethnic group
in order to foster feelings of acceptance and to develop a sense of
community. This minority status may also lead them to develop a
shared sense of identity with other marginalized groups (Smith,
2013), including groups with whom they do not have a shared ethnic identity. Alternately, religious adherents have been shown to
exhibit higher levels of in-group preferences and prejudice towards
out-group members than non-religious adherents (Altemeyer, 2003;
Hall et al., 2010; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999), which likely encourages religious adherents to participate in the practices of their own
ethnic group and serves as a barrier to participation in the practices
of other ethnic groups.
White students who identified as non-religious in our sample reported lower scores on the Racial component of white racial
identity in relation to white college students who self-identified as
Catholic, supporting research demonstrating that religious populations are more likely to support individual, rather than structural,
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explanations of racial inequality in comparison to non-religious
whites (Frost & Edgell, 2017). However, we also found evidence that
this pattern may not be true for all religious students, as the non-religious students in our sample reported similar scores on the Racial component of white racial identity in relation to students who
self-identified as Christian or Jewish. One possible explanation for
this discrepancy is that much of the existing research that has found
a relationship between religiosity and individual explanations for
racial inequality has been conducted in non-college samples. Our
findings suggest that there may be something unique about the college experience that moderates the relationship between religion
and support for structural, versus individual, explanations for racism, at least for Christian and Jewish students.
The non-religious white college students in our sample also reported lower scores on the Institutional component of white racial
identity in comparison with white college students who self-identified as Catholic or Christian, indicating that non-religious students were less likely to trust mainstream American institutions
than students who identified as religious. These findings counter
research that has shown that institutional trust is not influenced
by religious identification (Taylor et al., 2007). Our findings can be
explained by religious Americans increased likelihood to develop
identities that embrace authoritarianism (Hunsberger, 1996), social
conformity, and tradition (Hall et al., 2010). Taken together, these
personality traits lead religious individuals to embrace conventional social institutions as an integral part of a healthy, well-functioning society. In addition, religious adherents in general, and
Christians in particular, are likely more supportive of American
institutions given the fact that these institutions by their very nature are guided by the values of the dominant culture and meant
to facilitate continued dominance of the majority group, which is
largely religious. This is especially true for many white Americans.
Therefore, it is in the self-interest of many religious white Americans to support conventional American institutions. Alternately,
savvy members of non-dominant groups, such as the non-religious,
may be aware that conventional institutions do not serve their own
self-interests, and are therefore less likely to hold these institutions
in high regard.
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The non-religious white college students in our study generally reported stronger white racial identities in comparison with the
religious white college students in our study, as evidenced by their
lower scores on five of the eight components we used to measure
white racial identity. The only exception to this was that non-religious whites in our study reported higher scores on the Food component of white racial identity in comparison with white college
students who self-identified as Jewish, indicating that non-religious
students were more likely to partake in traditional white American
food practices than the Jewish students in this study. This pattern
is likely due to the fact that Jewish people comprise an ethno-religious group, and consistent with that grouping, have established
cultural practices, including food preparation and consumption
practices, that may fall outside the realm of traditional white American norms (Ammerman, 2021; MacDonald-Dennis, 2006).
Non-religious white college students reported similar scores
on the Intimate components of white racial identity in comparison
with religious white college students, indicating that both groups
of students were equally likely to report close relationships with
individuals outside of their racial group. These findings complicate research that suggests that non-religious populations are more
likely to embrace cross-racial contact than religious populations
(Hall et al., 2010). Although non-religious white students were more
likely to support cross-racial relationships in theory than religious
white students, these beliefs did not always translate into an increased likelihood for close interracial relationships. This could be
due to the fact that both non-religious and religious white students
regularly interact in segregated spaces, wherein it may be difficult
to develop close interracial relationships, but is also likely due to
the implicit bias and colorblind racism that permeate white racial
identities, regardless of the progressive attitudes that whites espouse (Bonilla-Silva, 2006).
Lastly, although non-religious white students reported many
unique attitudinal, behavioral, and cultural patterns in relation to
their religious peers, they did not completely disassociate from key
white cultural practices, including Music and Food preferences. In
particular, the non-religious white students in our study scored similarly on the Music component of white racial identity in comparison
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to white students of any religious identification, and similarly on the
Food component of white racial identity in comparison to students
that self-identified as Catholic or Christian. These findings reinforce
research about the hegemonic nature of whiteness (Hughey, 2010;
Lewis, 2004), which indicates that white students’ racial identities
undergo a process of standardization as a result of their shared positioning as members of a dominant racial group.

Limitations
This study is not without limitations. A key limitation of
our study was our limited sample size. Therefore, although the
socio-demographics of our sample were reflective of various population frequencies for white college students at public universities,
the generalizability of these findings to all white college students
should be interpreted with caution. Despite this, our sample far exceeds the suggested sample size requirements for relative bias of
less than 10% (Austin & Steyerberg, 2015) and rule of thumb estimates that sample sizes include at least 30 participants per independent variable (Cohen et al., 2003; Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 2013). As
our focus was on white college students, we were not able to compare whether the patterns we found in this research hold true for
other racial-ethnic groups. Future research should explore whether
the patterns we found in this research hold true in other samples.
In addition, future research could explore the relationship between white racial identity and alternate measures of religiosity,
including intrinsic or extrinsic religious orientations (Batson et al.,
2001). Research could also explore the relationship between participants’ level of religious devotion and adherence and the strength of
their racial identity. Along these lines, additional research may also
want to consider whether there are significant differences in white
racial identity within the category of non-religious. Although our
research did not bear this out, recent research has demonstrated
that the non-religious fall into three distinct categories, including
agnostic, atheist, and non-affiliated theists (Baker, 2021). Individuals in all three categories are united by their disassociation with
traditional religious practices, but vary in the particular practices, orientations, and rituals they embrace. As with any analysis of
this type, the results we report here are correlational, and do not
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indicate causation between our variables. Finally, as previous studies have demonstrated that political orientation is an indicator of
the American component of white racial identity, we included it as
part of our dependent construct, and thus, did not include it as a
control variable in our model.

Suggestions for Practitioners
Our work reveals that non-religious white college students
may be important stakeholders in cultivating racial egalitarianism
on college campuses. As such, college campuses would benefit by
developing programs that could help mobilize non-religious white
college students in the fight for racial equality. For example, programs could be developed to increase the efficacy of a variety of
staff that interact with non-religious students on campus, including
college counselors and professors. Programs could also be developed to facilitate stronger bonds between non-religious students
and other student groups on campus around shared issues of racial equality. Finally, our research suggests that college campuses
would be well served by creating programs that combine anti-racist
training with programming for individuals from a variety of religious identifications.

Conclusion
Overall, these findings suggest that non-religiosity may be
linked to modes of white racial identity development that encourage
white college students to embrace progressivism and anti-racism efforts. Taken together, our findings support research that has uncovered a religion-racism paradox (Hall et al., 2010), wherein religious
individuals exhibit an increased propensity for racism, despite the
idealized values they uphold. This paradox is rooted in practices
that encourage religious adherents to create social hierarchies that
justify the devaluing of non-religious populations, which likely extends to other out-group members (Altemeyer, 2003; Hall et al., 2010;
Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999). However, non-religiosity should not
be heralded as a perfectly linear pathway to anti-racism for white
students, as some non-religious students still reported support for
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attitudinal, behavioral, and cultural components of white racial
identity that have been shown to be associated with prejudice and
racism in previous research, albeit they reported less overall support than religious students. Our work offers new contributions to
the study of religion and white racial identity by exploring how
white racial identities differ for non-religious and religious white
college students, and in so doing, reveals areas of development for
both non-religious and religious white college students that could
lead to more racial egalitarianism on college campuses.
Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank Angela Nurse and
Anna Rachel Terman for their feedback on earlier versions of this article.

Endnotes
1. Although not the focus of this paper, recent research has started
to articulate and explore the significance of intra-group distinctions
within the category of non-religious. See Heft, J. L., & Stets, J. E.
(Eds.). (2021). Empty churches: Non-affiliation in America. Oxford University Press.
2. Although rates of non-religiosity have since been on the rise, data
from 2014 is presented here to contextualize the social environment
students were immersed in when our data was collected.
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Importance of Education as a Coping Strategy
to Sudanese Refugee Women: A Qualitative
Study from Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya
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Research shows the level of importance that education plays in refugee
youths’ lives. However, most research is completed with refugees who have
resettled to a developed nation and rarely examines the needs and desires
of refugee women living in refugee camps. This sub-section of a study examines the importance of education, as well as a hope of education, in a
population of young Sudanese women living in Kakuma Refugee Camp.
This study shows that the younger refugee women’s primary goal was education, although most were not able to participate in formal education at
the time of the study. A hope for education and the ability of education to
change the direction of their lives was highlighted.
Keywords: Sudan, refugee, education, hope, coping
The number of refugees spending long periods of time in refugee camps continues to climb. In 2020, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) counted 26 million refugees
in the world. Half of them are under the age of 18 (UNHCR, 2020).
The number of refugees has grown in recent years. For example,
Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya, the camp in which this study
took place, hosted around 80,000 refugees at the time of the study
and currently hosts about 147,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2018). UNHCR
(2015) reports that the average duration of a refugee in exile is more
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than two decades. Refugees primarily stay in camps, although they
may not stay in the same camp or have a continuous residence. Options for leaving the camp—either though a return to the refugees’
home country, integration in the host country, or resettlement to
a third country—were scarce for many even before the COVID-19
pandemic struck (Siegfried, 2020). Opportunities for resettlement
are even more limited now. The numbers reflect this reality: resettlement numbers fell 69% in the first half of 2020 from 2019 figures
(McAllister, 2020). Refugee camps exist to provide short-term protection and emergency basic needs; however, refugees’ extended
stays in the camps reflects a need for greater services and sustainable activities. Women and children are more likely to reside in refugee camps long term and often have additional burdens due to
gender inequality issues (UNHCR, 2008).
Although a fair amount of research exists on refugees, most examines those who have been resettled to a developed nation. Less
research has focused on refugee women who reside in host countries or refugee camps. As discussed in (Gladden, 2013), the lived
experiences of refugee women and girls in camps can be quite different from those of refugee men, and even more different from
the refugees who have been resettled to developed nations. We do
not know enough about the experiences of refugee women living
in camps, what resources they have (Pavlish, 2005), or what they
need. The scant research on this issue identifies education—including primary, secondary, tertiary/university, and trade programs
—as a significant need for these women (Crea & McFarland, 2015;
Dryden-Peterson et al., 2017; Mareng, 2010; Topuzova & Lock, 2013;
Waters & Leblanc, 2005). As Waters and Leblanc (2005) discuss,
most refugee relief is focused on the immediate needs of shelter,
food, water, and protection. However, given the increasing length
of stays in refugee camps today, relief should look beyond meeting
basic needs to the refugees’ dreams for the future. The hope for education contributes to the ability of refugees to cope with their current setting, and when available, education can prepare refugees for
their futures. This paper focuses on the importance of education in
refugee camps, particularly for women and female youth.
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Literature Review
Youth’s Desire for Education
Most of the research on refugees has focused on those who have
been resettled to or are residing in developed nations (Essomba,
2017; Hattam & Every, 2010; Shakya et al., 2012). Some studies focus
on the importance of education, and although a few examine refugees living in camps, most examine refugees resettled in other nations (Dryden-Peterson, 2017; El Jack, 2010; Essomba, 2017; Hattam
& Every, 2010; Mareng, 2010; Shakya et al., 2012). Many studies (Crea
& McFarland, 2015; Dryden-Peterson, 2017; El Jack, 2010; Mareng,
2010) have reported that refugee youth who reside in refugee camps
have a primary goal of receiving an education. Youth see education
as necessary to change their own lives and be able to support themselves. This hope for a change from their current situation is highly important for refugee youth, especially in camp settings where
there is little else upon which to focus. For many refugee youth, this
hope is a highly important coping strategy. Bates et al. (2005) noted
that for refugee youth who have been resettled into other countries,
education was a key coping strategy, and often a strength for the
youth, despite the challenges of attending school in systems that
were unprepared to meet their needs. While refugee youth in host
country refugee camps may not be attending school, the hope for
education in the future can provide a vision of a way to change
their current status in life, and this hope can assist them in coping
with their daily challenges (Gladden, 2013). Thus, both attending
educational programs as well as a hope of education can be important coping strategies for refugees.
Although refugees want education, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948) declares that education is a basic human right, many refugees do not have access.
Research reflects refugees who have arrived from camps to resettlement nations typically lack education. For example, Shakya et al.
(2012) report low levels of both education and language skills in
refugees who have arrived in Canada from refugee camps.
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Idleness vs. Empowerment
One problem for refugees, particularly refugee youth, is the
lack of constructive activities within the camps. Refugees report
feelings of frustration that they have been forgotten (Meda et. al.,
2012; Wright & Plasterer, 2010). While older adults often appear
consumed with providing basic needs for their families and trying
to find a path out of the refugee camps, younger individuals may
not have this focus. As Wright and Plasterer (2010) discuss, youth
without educational or supportive activities may be “idle and forgotten” (p. 45). Waters and Leblanc (2005) quote Ruud Lubbers, a
former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, stating
that the alternative to education is “depression and idleness, and…a
range of anti-social activities and the thought of revenge through
a renewal of armed conflict” (p. 136). When refugees have opportunities to be involved in educational settings, however, they experience protective factors of meaning and stability (Topuzova &
Lock, 2013). Educational opportunities also can assist in preventing
violence and allowing for healing in the community (Topuzova &
Lock, 2013). Education for children in these settings is necessary to
end the existing conflict and rebuild societies once the conflict has
ended (Dryden-Peterson et al., 2017).
Education allows individuals to feel empowered and creates
purpose. This empowerment may come from a feeling of mastery
over specific skills or from an expanded worldview (Crea & McFarland, 2015). Education also can empower community members
to support and improve the community. El Jack (2010) argues that
education, especially through university levels, “enables refugees,
particularly women, to gain knowledge, voice, and skills which will
give them access to better employment opportunities and earning
and thus enhance their equality and independence.” (p. 19). Educational opportunities can contribute to the long-term support of
the communities by strengthening human resources (Topuzova &
Lock, 2013). Educational opportunities can be particularly significant for young female refugees to provide a foundation for leadership and allow young women to make informed choices in their
lives (Mareng, 2010).
Crea & McFarland (2015) note that education provided students in Kakuma Refugee Camp with specific skills to help their
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community. For example, students learned to assist with conflict mediation between different cultures. Educational programs
can provide life changing skills even while refugees reside in the
camps. For example, with education, refugees could become teachers in the camp schools - one of the few formal employment opportunities available (Wright & Plasterer, 2010). The empowerment
model views vulnerable populations, such as women and people
of color as “essential forces to mobilize social changes” (Cheung
& Canda, 1994, p. 139). These researchers recommend integrating
empowerment strategies into trainings to allow individuals within
this population to be able to mobilize to help themselves and their
own communities.
Challenges for Female Refugees
While all refugee youth have difficulty accessing educational
opportunities, the situation is especially dire for females. Topuzova and Lock (2013) note that female refugees are less likely to participate in education due to cultural beliefs and norms, work expectations for women, and safety issues. Bellino (2018) reports that
female students have lower enrollment in secondary educational
settings and tend to drop out in higher grades. El Jack (2010) reports
that for the women in Kakuma Refugee Camp, refugee women experience a gendered and unequal level of access to the education
opportunities that are available.
Cultural norms and family responsibilities tend to be barriers
to women obtaining education; displacement in the refugee camps
compounds these issues. For example, women in the Sudanese culture tend to lag in terms of education (Mareng, 2010). Male children
may be preferred to females, as they are considered the heirs of the
family lineage. Both genders in the Sudanese culture are taught to
follow strict gender roles, and the girls expected to be married off to
other families and provide children (El Jack, 2010). Before marriage,
young women and girls are expected to stay in the home to cook,
collect firewood, and care for younger children. Thus, many parents
prefer to keep the female children at home and allow the male children to receive an education (Crea & McFarland, 2015; Dryden-Peterson et al., 2017; Mareng, 2010). Some female students reported desiring education specifically to escape from the traditional cultural
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roles that they considered “family oppression,“ believing that education would allow them to take control of their lives (Mareng,
2010). The United Nations has projected that COVID-19 may make
the situation even worse, with the possibility that half of young
refugee girls will not return to school when classrooms re-open
(Keung, 2020).

Methods
This paper uses a sub-sample of data gathered in an exploratory
study of the coping strategies of Sudanese refugee women living in
Kakuma Refugee Camp. This study employed a qualitative interview
questionnaire with nineteen open-ended questions based on previous research on coping strategies. Before the primary study in Kakuma, the questionnaire was pilot-tested with a local Southern Sudanese sample and edited as recommended. The author’s institutional
human review board approved the study and questionnaire, as did
the government of Kenya. Local Sudanese refugee leaders were approached and given information on the study before it commenced,
and they assisted in locating the first participants in the study.
Sample and Demographics
This study includes qualitative interviews of thirty adult Sudanese refugee women who were living in Kakuma Refugee Camp
at the time of the study. All interviews took place in Kakuma Refugee Camp at the location of the participant’s choosing. The participants’ ages ranged from 18 to approximately 50 (not all women
were aware of their ages) and all were from the southern Sudanese
Dinka people or stated they were not a part of any ethnic group (via
interpreters) but spoke the Dinka language. Interviews took place
utilizing an interpreter in the Dinka language, were recorded, and
the English interpretations were transcribed verbatim. Swahili was
utilized in some cases to clarify points with the interpreter. Participants were located through convenience and snowball sampling.
Ten of the participants were in the 18–19-year-old age range. This
sub-sample noted a slightly different set of coping strategies. They
also reported a higher level of education (several years to some
secondary education vs. no education to several years for the older
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sample) and all ten reported never having been married (as opposed
to the older group, who had all been or were currently married).
Analysis
Data analysis occurred by utilizing NVivo, and a research assistant also analyzed a random 20% of the full interviews to check
for coding discrepancies. Both open coding and axial coding was
utilized as described by Strauss and Corbin (1990). Negative case
analysis with a review for contradictory evidence was also used to
discover any cases in which one interviewee’s experience showed
that not all women shared the general categories of these phenomenon. The field notes, informal interviews, and previous theory
from the literature later provided triangulation for this analysis as
transcripts were reviewed for similarities and possible contradictory evidence. During analysis, a different set of coping strategies,
primarily those focused on future hopes and education, was noted
and further analyzed for this paper.

Results
The analysis from the questionnaire indicated that respondents
of all age sets listed support from family and friends, religious/
spiritual beliefs, formal supports such as agencies within the camp,
and a hope that their lives will someday change as primary coping mechanisms (Gladden, 2013). The older age group primarily
focused on basic needs such as obtaining food and shelter. They
explained, “sometimes I don’t have food in the house, neighbor give
that. Don’t have water. Share it. Help each other.” Another response
mentioned formal supports for obtaining basic needs, stating “UN
(United Nations) people gave us food, the house, even those plate
for eating.” For the older participants, the primary hope for change
appeared to be that God may eventually provide relief, as seen in
the quote, “I think that one day, one time, God will change my everything. That is my hope.”
One major difference in coping strategies among the younger
set of participants was an emphasis on education. While several
individuals within the older age categories noted a hope for their
children to receive an education, the focus was not on their own
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ability to obtain this. One woman stated that “if they go to school
they will get a better life, but now they don’t go to school maybe
they will be poor or end up survive like me. […] if the children
cannot go to school, how can my life change?” The hope for these
older women was that their children might receive an education,
which would allow their children to have the financial ability to
help themselves as well as the rest of the family. In contrast, the
younger age group (18–19-year-olds) was much more focused on
education as a pathway to new lives for themselves. All but one individual of the younger age set wished to continue their education.
However, at the time of the study, only one was actively attending
school. Issues relating to finances appeared to be the most common
barrier. One individual stated, “I want to go back to school. There
is no chance. I don’t have a sponsor who can help me.” Another
woman stated, “I need someone who can put me in school.” In most
refugee camps, families must come up with fees for books and uniforms, and many families are not able to afford these minimal costs.
Nine of the 10 the younger Sudanese women in the study reported hope for education as one of their primary coping strategies.
While they also relied on the above strategies, they appeared to
have a stronger hope that they could control and change their own
situations if they received an education. One young woman stated,
“The important thing is to go to school.” She considered finding a
way to receive education as her primary goal. Others had similar
statements with a focus on the future. For example, one woman
stated her hope that “If I finish school, I will get good life.” Others
provided statements such as “I want more knowledge to help me in
the future” and “If I finish my education maybe at that time it can
change life.” They were hopeful that with education, they would be
able to find a more satisfactory path in life. One stated, “If I get time
in future, then I will finish my education, I will be happy.” They
had hope that, with an education, they would be able to find employment to provide for their needs. These young women saw the
older women in the camp who were unemployed and struggled to
meet basic needs. Of the 20 older women interviewed in this study,
only two reported any form of employment. These two individuals
noted they carried water from the water pumps to the homes of
other refugees who had more resources in exchange for food. The
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hope of the younger women was to be able to obtain an education
to find more formal and sustainable employment opportunities.
Unfortunately, due to the limitations of the educational system
in the camp, some did not feel that their needs would be meet. The
one student who was still able to attend school noted, “We have not
enough school here in Kakuma.” Another individual, when discussing their education in the camp, stated that they “went to school just
for the name. I did not try hard.” Although the majority of students
were able to continue their hope for a better future through education, some, such as this individual, recognized the limitations of
what camp education would be able to provide for her.
The majority of the women interviewed in the study were focused on meeting their own basic needs. When one’s own needs are
so great, it can be difficult to think beyond one’s immediate family.
Only one woman mentioned a desire to help others. She stated, “If I
get knowledge, I can help somebody and I can help myself.” This outlook towards assisting the community as a whole appears to be fairly
rare. However, it is an important distinction. When refugees are able
to look beyond their needs to the needs of the community, they will
be able to assist with the long-term rebuilding of their community.

Discussion
As research has shown (Bellino et al., 2018; Crea & McFarland,
2015; Topuzova & Lock, 2013; Waters & Leblanc, 2005), one of the
best strategies to help a community improve their conditions is to
empower those within the community. Community members have
the connections and cultural understanding to make the changes
that the community itself wants. Furthermore, individuals who
wish to return to their home country also value receiving an education in the camps (Bellino, 2018), although studies also note that
formal education alone may not provide for all basic needs.
The fact that so many refugees desire an education that they are
not receiving demonstrates the need for a greater commitment from
funding sources for educational opportunities. In 2011, UNESCO
reported that only about 30% of children aged 12–17 were attending secondary school in conflict areas. Further, less than 4% of total
humanitarian funding in these areas goes towards education, and
schooling is often the first item cut during budget deficits. Education
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in refugee camps is often not of high quality (Shakya et al., 2012).
Many refugees may find it difficult to be invested in schooling when
they do not know if they will wake up the next morning.
Education for Creating Social Capital
Education in conflict areas can be a restorative and normalizing aspect of childhood, guiding students towards the promise of a
better future (Bellino, 2018). Schooling also can provide youth with
social and emotional support not otherwise available (McCarthy,
2018). Meda et al. (2012) similarly discusses education as a method
of meeting psychosocial needs for refugee children, including coping with trauma. Additionally, being in an educational setting with
a clear focus and contact with other like-minded youth can provide
students with a way to become invested in a positive activity, reducing issues of delinquent behavior and depression due to boredom. Social and academic supports for youth who are engaged in
education in Kakuma Refugee Camp can help these students move
from being or feeling dependent on camp systems to being engaged
in reciprocal exchanges (Bellino, 2018). El Jack (2010) discusses the
importance of the educational structure, citing an interview completed with a Sudanese woman in which she states, “Education
is my father and mother. It tells me what is right and wrong and
shows me the way” (p. 19). Thus, education can be a stabilizing factor, reducing violence and increasing positive coping (Topuzova &
Lock, 2013).
Unfortunately, many refugee camps lack both the structure to
provide educational opportunities for refugee youth and the funding
to do so. Wright and Plasterer (2010) state that primary and secondary education desperately need an increase in funding. Bellino (2018)
discusses the difficulty of the structural gap between primary and
secondary school in Kakuma Refugee Camp, limiting many youths
to only primary education. Low quality education and poor learning conditions compound this challenge. Some students in Kakuma
noted that they had to walk up to 10 km to get to school (Mareng,
2010). Crea & McFarland (2015) note that students reported challenges around the lack of school materials and issues of food insecurity which present major barriers to attending school. Another compounding issue is that some funders are concerned about ensuring
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that refugees do not receive a higher quality of education than the
local population (Dryden-Peterson, 2017) where camps are located.
Lack of Higher Educational Opportunities
Bellino (2018) warns that primary and secondary education may
be insufficient to change the lives of refugees if the infrastructure
to provide opportunities for employment or higher education is not
available. The schools in Kakuma Refugee camps are not only lacking in funding and teachers, but also lacking in support from the
community (El Jack, 2010). One study notes the lack of tertiary or
university education available to most refugee students (Crea & McFarland, 2015). The scarcity of quality education for refugee youth is
concerning, especially as the access to education is an important part
of the durable solutions for refugees in Africa (Meda et al., 2012). Refugees need access to education to gain the knowledge and skills they
need for durable solutions, whether repatriation, local integration,
or resettlement (Wright & Plasterer, 2010). The education provided
in Kakuma Refugee Camp is not sufficient to assist the students in
their goals of attaining any of the durable solutions (Mareng, 2010).
Further, students may not invest in their education when few opportunities seem to be present once education is complete. A student in
the Shakya et al. study (2012) shared a traditional saying from their
people group that implied that whether one was educated or not, one
would be likely to obtain similar forms of employment. 			
Despite the overwhelming challenges, some hope remains. For
example, some programs are exploring the possibility of providing
tertiary education within a camp and allowing for transfer of credits once a student either resettles or repatriates (Crea & McFarland,
2015). Distance learning with university partnerships may also
provide the possibility of continued education (Wright & Plasterer,
2010). A few programs are seeking to provide these opportunities,
such as the World University Service of Canada together with the
Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative and the Borderless Higher Education for Refugees Program (Dryden-Peterson
et al., 2017). The greater availability of online education would seem
to be a promising way to increase educational opportunities; however, this initiative requires infrastructure such as computers and
internet access. An increase in the availability of programs such
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as these will be essential to provide refugees with the skills and
knowledge they need to navigate society.
Another way to bridge the gaps in formal education programs
is through trade and certificate programs. Some initiatives provide
focused education in areas that will increase refugees’ ability to
learn a skill and possibility lead towards future employment. These
programs offer similar benefits as more formal education: they provide a constructive activity that can give refugee students hope and
a positive community. Examples such as the Community Service
Learning Track (Topuzova & Lock, 2013) have shown positive results that parallel those seen in formalized educational programs.
These trade programs have been able to provide a sense of empowerment to both the individuals and the communities that participate, as well as leadership skills for the participants (Topuzova &
Lock, 2013). An additional benefit to these programs is that they
may not require the completion of a primary or secondary education to participate, which would be useful for adult refugee women
who have not had these previous educational experiences.
Reducing the Gender Gap
Female refugees face particular challenges in refugee camps.
Specific programs should be created to encourage the attendance
of young refugee women in educational settings. The cultural
norms in many parts of the world, including for the Sudanese in
this study, must be considered, and the benefits of female education
will need to be shown in local communities. Mareng (2010) stated
that girls had a strong commitment to studying to increase their
sense of independence, and they wanted to be free from the family
expectations of solely taking care of the family through cooking,
cleaning, and childcare. Women have shown some successes when
given opportunities. One Somali woman in Kakuma Refugee Camp
was able to obtain a diploma and become a teacher in the camp
schools (eventually becoming the headmistress), which increased
enrollment of girls in that school dramatically (Crea & McFarland,
2015). One study noted that young refugee women hoped to become teachers—one of the few employment opportunities available
in refugee camps (Pherali & Turner, 2018).
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Refugee women need to see examples of women in leadership
and educational roles. Wright and Plasterer report that the efforts
of local NGOs to improve female attendance in schools has been
meet with some success, requiring the involvement of community outreach programs, scholarships, and adult literacy programs to
strengthen adults’ investment in learning (2010). Dryden-Peterson
et al. (2017) note that when girls’ mothers were supportive of their
daughters receiving an education—even if they themselves had
none—the girls were able to find the courage to attend school. The
mothers were able to decrease the domestic work expected of the
girls and to provide the encouragement needed. Additional programs and community-based work could increase these examples
and provide more young refugee women with the support needed
to attend school.

Limitations
While this study has strengths in focusing on the words and
experiences of refugee women currently living in a refugee camp,
international research holds its own set of limitations. Data collection was challenging in this setting, as the primary researcher is
a Western- based Caucasian female. Although the parameters of
the research study were explained to participants, it is likely that
some refugees who participated may have edited their responses
for what they may have seen as either a possible link for additional resources or to protect themselves by not providing information
fully. Time limitations did not allow for extended time within the
camp to develop more trusting relationships.
Language barriers are common challenges for international research. This researcher participated in four years of Swahili courses
to attempt to prepare for and limit the difficulties of language barriers. The participants in this study were Dinka speaking individuals, some with Swahili as a second language, and thus interpreters
who spoke Dinka, Swahili, and English, referred by the United Nations and Sudanese communities, were utilized. The interpreters
utilized the Dinka language, with some questions being discussed
with the researcher in Swahili when questions arose. Additionally,
the original study questions from which this sub-set of data was
developed was pilot tested with Dinka speaking refugees in the
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local community of the researcher to screen for questions that may
not have cultural relevance or be confusing in the Sudanese culture. Based on the pilot testers’ feedback, the study was deemed
culturally appropriate.

Conclusion and Recommendations
All but one the younger Sudanese women in the study reported that the hope of an education was one of their primary coping
strategies. The majority of the young women hoped that if they had
the opportunity to become educated, they could change their lives.
The women reported the hope that they would be able to find employment if they received education. The women would then be
able to support themselves as well as their family members and
communities. Although none of the women in the older age brackets expressed having hope of education for themselves, several of
them reported a hope that at least some of their children would be
able to receive an education. Unfortunately, as the participants in
this study reported, despite the desire for education, they were not
able to access educational programs. Refugees need access to an
education in the camps whether they return to their home country or remain in the camps. This research confirms a need to move
beyond emergency short-term services in camp settings, and to include education as a priority (Topuzova & Lock, 2013).
In order to provide for the levels of educational services desired
by younger refugees (females, in the case of this study), a greater amount of funding will be required. As stated earlier, less than
4% of total humanitarian funding in these areas goes towards education, and schooling is often the first item cut during budget
deficits, causing both the availability and quality of education to
suffer (Shakya et al., 2012). Due to COVID-19, the numbers of refugee youth attending school has dropped, particularly for young
female refugees. UNHCR (2021) reports that it is estimated that half
of the female refugee students who previously attended school will
not be returning for the next academic year. Greater funding commitments from supporting developed nations will be necessary to
increase and improve educational systems within refugee camps,
with an emphasis on assisting female refugee students who wish
to return to school. With greater funding, a variety of educational
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opportunities, such as online learning and trade schools, could be
offered to support various levels of need within the refugee community. Although funding is always scarce, an increase in this
area could potentially have a high return. Benefits could include
increased ability for refugees to cope with their current situations,
improved social capital and independence, higher levels of skills
for durable solutions such as repatriation to the refugees’ home
countries, and a reduction of the gender gap. As one woman stated,
“The way people can help is with helping children in school. Then
you can change her life.”
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Book Reviews
World Bank, Reversals of Fortune: Poverty and Shared Prosperity, 2020.
World Bank. (2020). 178 pages, $43.00 (softcover).
Studies of international social welfare often refer to the reports
of international organizations such as the United Nations and the International Labour Office (ILO) which have extensively documented global social conditions and the social policies and programs of
different countries. That said, the work of the World Bank is often
ignored, largely because it is assumed that the organization is primarily concerned with issues of economic development that have
little relevance to social policy. However, as this publication reveals,
it has amassed valuable information about poverty, inequality and
living standards as well as the impact of the Coronavirus pandemic
on social well-being around the world.
Reversals of Fortune: Poverty and Shared Prosperity is the third in
a series of World Bank publications dealing with poverty and particularly with what the organization calls “shared prosperity,” by
which it means the extent to which economic growth improves the
well-being of those at the lower end of the income distribution. The
first in the series, which was published in 2016, made the case for
promoting income equality as a key element of development policy,
while the second, which was issued in 2018, refined its approach to
measuring poverty and reiterated its commitment to shared prosperity. These publications were optimistic showing that poverty
had declined steadily in many countries since the 1990s because of
responsive government policies. This latest publication is less hopeful, reporting that recent gains are being reversed not only because
of the Coronavirus pandemic, but because of armed conflict and
climate change. It argues that addressing these challenges must be
accompanied by policies that reduce poverty and promote equality.
The World Bank has not always been committed to policies of
this kind. Indeed, it has been primarily associated with neoliberal
economic development and the privatization of social services. Both
featured prominently in its agenda in the 1990s. As is well known,
the Bank (officially called the International Bank for Reconstruction
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and Development) was created, together with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), at an international conference sponsored by
the American and British governments at the Mount Washington
Hotel in the hamlet of Bretton Woods in New Hampshire in 1944.
The conference was convened to plan for a new global economic order which would not only address the ravages of the Second World
War but promote growth, stability and conditions favorable to international trade. In the decades following the conference, the Bank
focused on infrastructural investments, funding the construction
of hydroelectric dams, industrial parks, airports, railways and road
networks. However, in a landmark speech in 1972, World Bank President Robert McNamara announced that the organizations lending
policies would in future be concerned with alleviating poverty and
investing in education, health, rural development, nutrition and
housing. After his retirement in 1981, the organization’s focus again
changed and, in keeping with the economic and political climate
of the times, it now vigorously promoted neoliberal policies which
involved reducing government intervention and privatizing and
outsourcing statutory services. The Bank also imposed structural
adjustment programs on heavily indebted governments seeking
international aid. To receive aid, they were required to cut public
spending and adopt “market friendly” development policies. It also
played a major role in pension privatization in Latin America and
Eastern Europe, urging governments to adopt a “risk management
approach” which required elders to meet their retirement needs
by utilizing commercial financial institutions instead of relying on
government pensions.
By the time of the United Nations World Summit on Social
Development in 1995, it became apparent that these policies had
resulted in a significant increase in poverty and deprivation in
many parts of the world. Under new leadership, the Bank gradually
aligned itself with the United Nations and, following the adoption
of the Millennium Development Goals by the organization’s member states, it again focused on poverty alleviation. Somewhat surprisingly, it also supported the expansion of income transfers (or
social protection as it was now called) in order to alleviate poverty
in the developing world. However, like the United Nations, it was
more concerned with reducing poverty rather than inequality.
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This course changed when a Commission appointed by the
Bank in 2006 to study the distributive impact of economic development asserted that poverty alleviation would only be effective
if the poorest groups benefited directly from growth. Not a new
idea, having been promoted by progressive economists like Dudley
Seers and Gunnar Myrdal many years earlier, it attracted little attention at the time when it was generally accepted that poverty would
automatically decline because of rapid growth resulting from market based development policies. Adopting the Commission’s report
(World Bank, 2008), the Bank embraced what it originally called
“inclusive growth.” This approach was subsequently replaced with
the notion of “shared prosperity” which, as noted earlier, requires
that the incomes of those at the lower end of the distribution be
raised. It operationalizes this concept by measuring extent to which
the incomes of the bottom 40 percent increase relative to median
incomes over time.
Reversals of Fortune contains a wealth of information on global
poverty and income distribution. Drawing on the World Bank’s extensive databases, it traces the steady decline in poverty since the
1990s and shows that there have been significant improvements
in living standards for the world’s people since this time. However, it also shows that progress slowed even before the Coronavirus spread across the world. Both violence, especially in the Middle East and North Africa and climate change have contributed to
the recent increase in global poverty. The Coronavirus has had the
most devastating impact, disproportionately affecting hundreds of
millions of low income families around the world. The pandemic
poses a huge global challenge which, the Bank contends, must be
addressed at the global level. This requires that governments and
international organizations cooperate more effectively. In addition
to taking immediate steps to limit the spread of infections, concerted efforts will be needed to revitalize damaged economies and provide income support to those who have been severely affected.
Although this publication provides a thorough commentary on
the current global situation, its policy recommendations are limited to a relatively short chapter which lacks specificity about which
interventions are likely to be the most effective. Reference is made
to developments in different countries but more attention could be
given to implementation challenges and the costs and benefits of
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different policy options. The chapter is particularly thin on the role
of social protection in meeting the income needs of those whose
livelihoods have been devastated by the pandemic. Together with
economic stimulus policies, these interventions have featured
prominently in the repertoire of government responses, and a variety of interesting policy innovations have emerged in both high
income and developing countries. These could have been more systematically documented and more attention could have been paid
to their budgetary implications.
Nevertheless, this is an invaluable source of information about
the impact of the Coronavirus pandemic on poverty and inequality
around the world—as well as the effects of armed conflict and climate change. Recent trends are comprehensively and meticulously
documented. It uses sophisticated methodologies to operationalize key concepts and its ingenious but relatively straightforward
measure of income inequality is particularly useful. Its focus on the
relationship between poverty and inequality marks an important
development in the evolution of the World Bank’s thinking and will
undoubtedly influence scholars from many disciplines working in
the field. International social welfare scholars concerned with poverty and inequality will also benefit from making greater use of
the World Bank’s extensive data resources and the policy analyses
contained in this important publication. It deserves to be widely
consulted during these troubling times.
James Midgley
University of California, Berkeley
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